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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

OF AHSEN'S

EIDETIC PARENTS TEST

BY

LILLIAN KENNEDY

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF EDUCATION

IN

COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1987

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled a PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF AHSEN'S EIDETIC PARENTS TEST submitted by LILLIAN KENNEDY in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF EDUCATION in EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

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ABSTRACT

Eidetic images are vivid, repeatable images sometimes likened to non-pathological hallucinations. A great deal of energy has been expended trying to capture and identify eidetic images using natural scientific methods, with little to show for such efforts. The problem seems to be that researchers have been misled by the percept-like nature of these images into studying them as disembodied objects. The writer has taken a slightly different approach; that is, to focus on the subjective experience of the imager in relation to the eidetic images.

Akhter Ahsen's Eidetic Parents Test was used as a tool for exploring the subjective nature of eidetics. This test involves picturing one's parents in a variety of settings and attending to different aspects of the images. Eight people were "walked through" the first part of the Eidetic Parents Test. Next, a phenomenological analysis of the transcribed interviews was done in order to distill the underlying themes of the eidetic imagery experience.

The results discriminated two different patterns of response to the Eidetic Parents Test, identified as Dynamic protocols and Static protocols. The six Dynamic protocols yielded themes of A) felt-presence, integrity of the image is strong, B) image and co-researcher are responsive to each other (emotionally and kinesthetically), and C) during eidetic imagery, co-researcher participates in a world which is timeless, poetic, meaningful and vivid; having its own unique perception of people and events. All of these themes support Ahsen's own theory of eidetics. The two Static protocols were characterized by A) weak sense of felt-presence of the image, B) one-sided relationship (impact is from imager to image), and C) imagery is felt to be only superficially.

significant. The interviews for these protocols are viewed as unsuccessful attempts to elicit eidetic imagery.

Overall, the Dyanmic protocols confirm Ahsen's theories and the phenomenological analysis of these protocols show that eidetic imagery is a much more involving experience and more personally significant than has been suggested by other research methods.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW	3
A. Imagery and the Body	3
1. Jacobsen and Muscular Response to Imagery . .	3
2. Penfield's Interpretive Cortex	4
3. Cerebral Laterality	5
B. Laboratory Task Research	8
1. Paivio's Dual Code Model	8
2. Kosslyn's Computer Model	9
3. Pylyshyn's Critique	10
C. Clinical Uses of Imagery	12
1. Leuner's Guided Affective Therapy and Other Oneirotherapies	12
2. Jung's Active Imagination	16
3. Imagery and Hypnosis	17
4. Imagery and Behaviorism	18
5. Neuro-Linguistic Programming	19
6. Other Image Therapies	21
7. Clinical Image Therapies - Evaluation	21
D. Eidetic Imagery Research	22
1. Overview of Eidetic Research	22
2. Akhter Ahsen's Eidetic Psychotherapy	29
3. Present Study's Use of Ahsen's Eidetic Parents Test	36
III. THE PARADIGM PROBLEM	38
A. Historical Context: Locke and Kant	40
B. Natural Science and Human Science: Dimensions of Comparison	42
1. Demonstrative Versus Dialectical Reasoning	42
2. Realism Versus Idealism	43
3. Objective Versus Subjective	44
4. Extraspection Versus Introspection	45
5. Theory-Method Distinction	45
C. Human Science Paradigm	47

(continued)

(Table of Contents continued)

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. BASIC CONCEPTS IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY	49
A. Primacy of Experience	50
B. Bracketing	51
C. All Knowledge is Human Knowledge	51
D. Co-Constitutionality	52
E. Features of Psychological Life - Metaphor and Reflection	52
F. Meaning	53
G. Objectivity is Fidelity to the Phenomena	54
V. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD AND THE EIDETIC PARENTS TEST	57
A. Bracketing	58
B. Pilot Study	62
C. Co-researchers and Interviews	62
D. Thematic Analysis	64
E. Validation	68
VI. RESULTS: KNOTS IN THE WEB OF EXPERIENCE	70
A. Third Order Themes - Dynamic Protocols	76
1. Dynamism - spontaneity - autonomy	76
2. Mutual emotional responsiveness between image and co-researcher	78
3. Kinesthetic responsiveness to image	79
4. Image has multi-levels of meaning	80
5. There is an inherent structure of the image which resists direct manipulation	82
6. Image responds to verbal suggestions	84
7. Image reveals differentiation of parental qualities	85
8. Image reveals perceptions of parents not previously recognized	86

(continued)

(Table of Contents continued)

CHAPTER	PAGE
9. Sensory details of an image are vivid containers of experience	88
10. The image has its own time	88
11. The language of the image is poetic	89
12. There is discrimination among different kinds of imagery experiences	90
B. Third Order Themes - Static Protocols	
1. The image has a static, photographic quality	91
2. The co-researcher is not emotionally involved in the image but is neutral and distant	92
3. There is little kinesthetic involvement in the image	93
4. The image has literal meaning only	93
5. Parental qualities are not well differentiated	94
6. The co-researcher actively constructs the image	95
7. Caution, doubt and uncertainty characterize relationship between co-researcher and researcher, and also characterize attitude towards the Eidetic Parents Test	95
8. The image cannot be clearly discriminated from other imagery experiences	96
C. Fourth Order Themes and Descriptions of Imagery Experiences	97
VII. GENERAL DISCUSSION	102
A. Phenomenological Analysis and Ahsen's Theory	102
B. Present Study and Other Eidetic Imagery Research	107
C. Additional Comments - Imagery in General	108
D. Comments on Methodology	110
E. Conclusion	112
REFERENCES	113

(continued)

(Table of Contents continued)

	PAGE
APPENDIX A. Example of Thematic Analysis - William (Dynamic Protocol)	119
APPENDIX B. Second Order Themes - William (Dynamic Protocol) . .	145
APPENDIX C. Second Order Themes - Hilary (Dynamic Protocol) . . .	147
APPENDIX D. Second Order Themes - Miriam (Dynamic Protocol) . . .	148
APPENDIX E. Second Order Themes - Mark (Dynamic Protocol)	150
APPENDIX F. Second Order Themes - Jill (Dynamic Protocol)	151
APPENDIX G. Second Order Themes - Rachel (Dynamic Protocol) . . .	152
APPENDIX H. Second Order Themes - Gary (Static Protocol)	153
APPENDIX I. Second Order Themes - Candice (Static Protocol) . . .	154

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Description	Page
I	Thematic Analysis	65
II	Third Order Theme Clusters - Dynamic Protocols	73
III	Third Order Theme Clusters - Static Protocols	75
IV	Fourth Order Themes - Dynamic Protocols	98
V	Fourth Order Themes - Static Protocols	100

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

1. Flow Chart of Thematic Analysis

66

I. INTRODUCTION

He sat across from me, waving his hands mischievously, like an elf. I watched delightedly as liquid shooting stars came flying out of his fingers, bursting silently.

There was a time when an orange-haired mermaid would come out of her grotto to swim in the air around me. If I had a headache, I would feel her swim past me, brushing her long wet hair against my forehead until the tension went away.

Then there was the two French horns, golden twins, entwined and each one pulling the other way. They made me laugh and they made me sleepy. I had to stop listening and looking at them because I nearly fell asleep at a red light.

I naturally assumed that everyone saw things like these. I was astounded to discover this was not so. At that point, my interest in imagery began. What were these things, these reflections of the world? What did other people see; what could they see?

It seemed that eidetic imagery was one "meeting place" in psychology for such an interest. Eidetics have been described as vivid, durable images, or non-pathological hallucinations--I loved the ring of the last description. I was curiously cheered to find that experimental researchers in the area were still mystified by the phenomena, in spite of the most rigorous attempts to capture it. Ahsen's work on the complex nature of eidetic imagery, his references to the emotional and bodily involvement in eidetics, seemed a promising alternative, and I had been greatly affected by doing his Eidetic Parents Test (a series of therapeutic images). As a result, I decided to articulate for myself

what role imagery played in my life and to discover what other people's experiences of imagery, especially eidetic imagery, were like. The following pages describe the paths that I took and what I found along the way.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Although the present thesis will examine imagery from a phenomenological point of view, it is necessary to appreciate other sources of influence which came to bear on the subject of imagery. In order to set eidetic imagery within the context of imagery research as a whole, one must have at least a nodding acquaintance with other modes of enquiry. The vastness of the research and the multiplicity of methods used make it impossible to review all the significant areas thoroughly. However, it is possible to sample the research in many of these areas in order to familiarize oneself with the basic problems considered and methods used.

A brief foray into the relationship between imagery and the body begins the literature review. Then, the theories arising from laboratory task research (so-called because the method of research centers on prescribed tasks in a laboratory setting) are briefly acknowledged. Next, the different ways imagery has been used in clinical settings is examined. After this, the research on eidetic imagery and Ahsen's work on eidetics is reviewed.

Thus, the literature review departs from eidetic imagery initially to explore contributions of different avenues of imagery research. As these contributions are acknowledged, the review will funnel back into eidetic imagery research. Finally, the purpose and specific aims of the present thesis will be re-iterated.

A. Imagery and the Body

The first area to be considered is the relationship between physiology and imagery.

In the following pages, a cursory review of a few major studies

will be given and aspects of cerebral laterality and imagery will be explored.

1. Jacobsen and Muscular Response to Imagery. One of the most startling discoveries made is that an image, or at least an imagined activity, has a subtle physiological component. Jacobsen (1929, 1930) demonstrated that the pattern of muscular neuronal activity required to lift a weight is present (albeit lessened in strength) when a person is asked merely to imagine lifting a weight in the same manner. Jacobsen's landmark study suggests that imaginal activity has a somatic element which mimics the body's physiological response in an actual situation. The implication is that imagination is not as isolated from actual experience as it would appear, because images can have a direct effect upon the body.

2. Penfield's Interpretive Cortex. The intimate connection between the brain and imagery was demonstrated by Wilder Penfield (1963) as he operated to remove portions of the temporal lobe of epileptic patients. During these operations, electrical stimulation of what Penfield called the interpretive cortex led patients to experience past scenes and voices with hallucinatory-like vividness. (Because the patients were not under general anaesthetic they could both report and comment on the scenes as they were experienced.) Penfield notes that after such electrical stimulation, "It is as though a wire recorder or a strip of cinematographic film with sound track had been set in motion within the brain" (Penfield, 1959, p. 1719). These images are set apart from ordinary recall through their vividness, wealth of detail and sense of immediacy (Penfield, 1963). The patients could hear and see things as if they actually existed. Penfield was careful to point out that in

no way could the sites of electrical stimulation be supposed to contain actual engrams of experience because even if that portion of the brain was excised the patient was still able to recall the events activated by the electrode. However, these sites must be functionally related to some record of past experience. In an exhaustive account of all patients' recorded results, Penfield noted that the kinds of experiences recalled during the operation were essentially passive:

. . . watching others or hearing action or speech of other people, or hearing music. Situations where the patient is physically active, doing skilled work or in the throes of formulating a decision are entirely absent. Given the patient's enforced passivity on the operating table, it is possible that only past experience relevant to the patient's present situation is evoked. (Penfield, 1963, p. 690)

This again supports the functional view. Penfield suggested that the interpretive cortex "plays a role in the subconscious interpretation of what is seen or heard in the present" (p. 690) by eliciting similar past experiences and that, conversely, this same interpretive cortex may "assist in the process of adding to or altering a previously recorded concept" (p. 690).

The implication of Penfield's work is that our everyday flow of experience is somehow stored in the brain and that seemingly forgotten incidents are not truly lost. Through vivid imagery, one may actively re-experience events and re-interpret the present situation in light of these previous experiences. Penfield's provocative suggestion that in everyday life the interpretive cortex works subconsciously to summon up past similar experiences opens the way for postulating the existence of "unconscious imagery."

3. Cerebral Laterality. Another consideration in the physiological aspects of imagery is cerebral laterality. As early as 1874 the

neurologist J. H. Jackson suggested that the two hemispheres of the brain were asymmetrical in function (in Ley, 1983). Generally, it is thought that the left hemisphere predominates for language functions and for mental processes which use an analytic style of thinking (Ornstein, 1972). The right hemisphere is considered to be more adept at mental processes involving artistic abilities and a style of thinking which is more holistic. It should be noted that these are not exclusive specializations but that each hemisphere tends to be more involved in different kinds of tasks.

The following collection of evidence is taken from an extensive review by Ley on cerebral laterality and imagery (1983). Research indicates that the right cerebral hemisphere mediates imagery. In an experiment by Myslobodsky and Rattok (1977) a different galvanic skin response (GSR) was measured during imagery and verbal tasks (in Ley, 1983). It has been found that right hemisphere damage is associated with apraxia (difficulty or inability to draw or copy) and also with inability to recall dreams (Ley, 1983). In 1978, Milner identified the importance of the right temporal lobe for processes involving visual memory (in Ley, 1983). Regarding visual memory, Ley notes that "the bulk of evidence indicates that the temporal, parietal and occipital regions of the right hemisphere are integral for visual memory" (Ley, 1983, p. 261). In a fascinating experiment with a split brain patient, Gazzaniga and LeDoux (Ley, 1983, p. 265) sought to answer two questions:

First, is the visual image really visual, and second, does visual imagery utilize the same neural circuitry and cortical areas as visual perception? . . . Gazzaniga's experiments with split-brain patient, J. Kn., contradict the philosophical notion that images can simply be construed as faint sensations. Although J. Kn. was tactually split, his anterior commissure, which could transfer visual sensations,

was intact: the question remained as to whether these intact nerve fibers could also conduct visual images. The test was as follows: an object, a spoon, for instance, was placed in J. Kn.'s right hand, and he was told to make a picture of the spoon in his mind (i.e., the left hemisphere). After forming the image, he was repeatedly unable to retrieve the same object with his left hand from a hidden display. However, when a picture of a spoon was projected to the left hemisphere, J. Kn. could find the object with his left hand. Therefore, it seemed that the image of the spoon did not transfer from the left hemisphere to the right hemisphere, whereas the picture did. Thus, Gazzinaga and LeDoux concluded that the neural mechanisms for visual imagery are likely different from those utilized for visual sensory perception. (Ley, 1983, p. 266)

The overall conclusion is that "visual experience and visual imagery involve distinct patterns of neural circuitry" (Ley, 1983, p. 266).

Another interesting finding is that "the majority of experimental studies of normal subjects have found overall right hemispheric superiorities for processing a diversity of emotional stimuli including speech, music and facial expression" (Ley & Bryden, 1981 in Ley, 1983, p. 256).

More recently, a few experiments with normal subjects have produced results similar to those of the clinical domain: they suggest that each hemisphere uniquely participates in processing emotions of differing valence. (Ahearn & Schwartz, 1979; Harman & Ray, 1977 in Ley, 1983, p. 256)

Tentative findings suggest that the ~~left~~ hemisphere processes emotions of a positive valence and the right hemisphere processes emotions of a negative valence (Ley, 1983), but conflicting research results mean that no definitive statements can be made at this time.

Overall, the fact that the right hemisphere is implicated in processing both imagery and emotional stimuli has confounded experimental results because imagery often has an emotional valence and, conversely, emotions are often mediated through visual memory or associated images. "The enmeshment of imagery and emotional function

renders problematic any experimental attempts to isolate right hemisphere effects for one or the other process" (Ley, 1983, p. 269). There are obviously clinical implications for this enmeshment of emotion and imagery and these will be discussed later.

B. Laboratory Task Research

A major portion of imagery research involves having a subject undergo a rigidly prescribed task in a laboratory setting and then measuring the performance variables on that task. A theory of imagery emerges from an attempt to account for the consistencies and contradictions of the subjects' performance. This methodology has been used by some notable researchers and a sample of their work will be briefly reviewed.

1. Paivio's Dual Code. Alan Paivio's (1971) theory of imagery proposes a dual code model of information processing. Paivio states that information can be coded either verbally or "pictorially" in images and that the mode of storing information is determined by both individual preference and the demand characteristics of the task (Paivio, 1971). He has found that in memorizing lists of words, people tend to remember abstract words such as "liberty" and "freedom" in a verbal fashion (i.e., repeating the word to themselves, explaining the concept to themselves in simple terms). However, words that are highly concrete such as "chair" or "flower" tend to be remembered in imagistic fashion. Paivio's theory corresponds closely to his data and is an excellent account of people's performance on paired-associate learning tasks. The notion of two models of information processing is intriguing in the light of cerebral laterality because studies (previously discussed) indicate that the left hemisphere is generally more involved

in verbal processes and the right hemisphere more involved in imagery, or a pictorial mode.

However, in Paivio's view, imagery is actually an epiphenomenon to information processing and the pictorial code is implicitly a less sophisticated manner of storing information. As a general theory of imagery, Paivio leaves many things unexplained, such as evidence that imagery is sometimes involved in abstract problem solving which, according to Paivio, is mediated entirely by the semantic mode. Two examples of "imagistic" problem solving are Luria's famous mnemonist who performed mathematical calculations almost entirely pictorially, and the well known case of the chemist Kekule who used an image from a dream (an uroboros) to arrive at the structure of the benzene ring. Another area left completely untouched is that of imagery and affective involvement.

2. Kosslyn's Computer Model. Kosslyn and others (1979) have compared people's performance on imagery tasks to the operations of a computer. Kosslyn regards imagery as "a temporary spatial display in active memory generated from more abstract long-term memory" (Kosslyn et al., 1979, p. 535).

Active memory is an array-like medium, also subserving visual perception, that mimics a coordinate in space. Objects are depicted by selectively activating cells in this array, just as a matrix in a computer memory can be filled with elements whose distribution in the matrix defines some object or scene. (Ibid., p. 535)

According to Kosslyn, long-term memory is like a computer matrix which consists of pictorial information and "lists of facts in a 'symbolic' or 'propositional' format" (Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983, p. 52). Propositions include statements about qualitative aspects of objects such as size or location. Images in active memory are actually constructed from

whatever pictorial fragments are available combined with the conceptual or 'propositional' information in long-term memory. This explains why, for example, "subjects often have to check to make sure an image is fully retrieved" (Kosslyn, 1979, p. 536). They have to check to confirm that the construction process is completed.

Kosslyn's theory explains why long-term memory images are not always accurate--the active memory is constructed according to pictorial information and the subjects' own propositions. The propositions can be combined to alter images or form novel images. Therefore, images are not hauled out of long-term memory storage in the same way that someone would drag a dusty painting out of an attic, but are puzzled together piece by piece. The selective construction of memory images is an interesting notion and one that is consistent with clinical evidence that will be discussed later. It should be noted that Kosslyn's theory is based on data from a variety of laboratory experiments where, for example, subjects were asked to imagine objects, rotate these objects, judge their size and distance and report the length of time needed to perform these various mental tasks. The implication is that in Kosslyn's view, imagery has a purely representational function.

3. Pylyshyn's Critique. Pylyshyn (in Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983) takes the laboratory tasks to task. It is his contention that the data from imagery experiments merely reflect demands of the experimental situation and he makes the startling pronouncement that imagery is not involved in the performance of these tasks. A review of Pylyshyn's position outlines his major points:

1. In order to follow the instructions used in an image task . . . the subject must try to anticipate what would happen in the corresponding actual situation.

2. Subjects have the requisite tacit knowledge to know how objects would behave in the analogous physical situation and how their visual systems would record these events.
3. Subjects have the requisite psychophysical skills to time their . . . responses appropriately, mimicking the response they would have made were they actually viewing the to-be-imaged stimulus as described.
4. None of the computations involved in understanding the instructions, accessing and using stored tacit knowledge or making responses involves actual manipulation of a quasi-pictorial image. (in Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983, p. 65)

Pylyshyn argues that cognitive processes can completely account for performance on imagery tasks. He rightly points out that subjects are not necessarily manipulating an actual image. However, if one is to rely completely on observed measures of dependent variables then it is possible to discount the very existence of imagery itself. One could infer that all subjects who report seeing images are either misguided or lying. Pylyshyn's theoretical stance makes it possible for him to claim that if imagery cannot be properly measured, it does not exist.

Pylyshyn has soundly trounced the laboratory task research while overlooking a basic fact: people see images. Whether or not they can be "objectively measured" is a different problem entirely. Pylyshyn has fallen into the trap of instrumental commitment (Kuhn, 1962): his commitment to a method of measurement supersedes commitment to the phenomena in question. This means that psychological questions are defined not by the range of human experience, but by what can be measured. Consequently, human experiences that are difficult to measure run the risk of being dismissed or invalidated.

Pylyshyn's insightful and brilliant analysis of laboratory task research illustrates some of the problems inherent in this research method. He rightfully points out that objective measures are inadequate to demonstrate the existence of imagery, but does not realize that in

the case of imagery, an insistence on measurement as proof is inappropriate. People are not lying, they see images.

Laboratory research on imagery tends to formulate general theories of imagery from narrowly defined tasks. In the experimental method, the researcher infers how a person uses imagery by measuring dependent variables, thereby neglecting to ask the subjects themselves. The very personal connection between what the image is and who the "imager" is remains unexamined. The results of experimental research do contribute to an understanding of the phenomena, but the overriding flaw is that imagery is studied as a disembodied process. This flaw has plagued research on eidetic imagery as well.

C. Clinical Uses of Imagery

The major difference between an experimental approach and the clinical formulation of image theory is that clinicians are forced to account for clients' emotional involvement in the process of imagery. Rather than using the criteria of observable measures and circumscribed tasks, clinicians tend to base their theories on what works in therapy. The ways in which imagery has been used in psychotherapy are multi-fold and imaginative. The discovery of imagery techniques that are effective in therapy has provided additional information on the nature and function of imagery itself.

The following section will review some of the major image therapies. Emphasis is given to Hanscarl Leuner's approach because of its impact on North American psychotherapy and its influence on Ahsen's eidetic therapy. Other imagery methods are reviewed more briefly.

1. Leuner's Guided Affective Imagery and Other Oneirotherapies.

Hanscarl Leuner's guided affective imagery is one of the most well known

imagery therapies (Leuner, 1969, 1979; Singer & Pope, 1978; Watkins, 1976). Leuner comes from a school of European clinicians who routinely use image methods in therapy, and the introduction of his techniques in North American psychotherapy was the beginning of a more receptive attitude towards imagery. Leuner makes use of "catathymic imagery," a term which stems from "kata" meaning "dependent" and "thymos" meaning "soul, emotionality" (in Singer & Pope, 1978). Catathymic imagery is the "inner visions which occur in accordance with and are related to affect and emotions" (Leuner, 1969, p. 4) and the basis of Leuner's work is that there is a reciprocal relationship between imagery and emotion. This means that feelings can modify images, and vice versa: alteration of the image can produce corresponding affective change.

Leuner has developed a series of standard image scenes such as a meadow, a cave, a rose, and others (see Watkins, 1976). Clients are asked to visualize each scene and the therapist infers problem areas from the description of the image. For example, a meadow spotted with sharp rocks and half-dead tufts of grass would indicate some dysphoric feeling state on the part of the client. In this way, the image is used to diagnose emotional problems. The therapist's role is to guide the client through various image scenarios and to instruct him or her regarding interactions with the imaginary environment. For example, the therapist might suggest that the client water the meadow so that the grass becomes full and lush. The therapist thereby uses the image described as a tool for treatment. If the client is successful in transforming the meadow into a rich-green expanse, it is assumed that the client's emotional state has been correspondingly improved.

Two questions come to mind regarding the therapeutic process of

guided affective imagery: (a) on what basis were the standard image scenes selected? and (b) if clinical improvement occurs with "healthy images," why not simply prescribe healthy landscapes for any deficient images? Or, why not simply provide positive, cheerful scenes for clients to contemplate from the outset?

Leuner claims a universal applicability for his sequence of images and was influenced by Jung's theory of archetypes in choosing the images he did (Leuner, 1969). It is apparent that the standard scenes were selected on the basis of their accessibility to common experience, their possible relationship to archetypal themes and their proven usefulness in Leuner's own clinical experience. However, some interpretations of the scenes are questionable (e.g., Leuner insists that the image of a rose will elicit attitudes and feelings about femaleness) (see Watkins, 1976). It is likely that Leuner's prescribed list of images are not the only useful ones.

The second question, concerning simple prescription of "improvements" for an image or substitution of idyllic scenes, touches upon the relationship between an individual and a particular image. For example, a therapist's suggestion that the client water the dry tufty meadow may not work. The water may evaporate in the heat, or sink uselessly into a crack or the client may be unable to imagine watering the meadow at all. The image often demonstrates a certain measure of autonomy by remaining impervious to practical suggestion or sheer force of will. Only some kinds of manipulations upon the imaginary scene work, and these are determined by the suitability of the suggestion and abilities of the client, among other things (Watkins, 1976).

Leuner addresses this problem by introducing the concept of "mobile

projection." "... When a suggestion or interpretation of the therapist is relevant to the meaning of the image, it is followed by a sudden transformation of the image" (Leuner, 1969). Thus, the image becomes mobile only when the therapist somehow touches a hidden spring of emotional transformation through an appropriate interpretation or suggestion. Mobile projection demonstrates that a person's response to a standard scene is highly individualized and that the personal meaning of the image must be articulated before affective change can occur. The implication of Leuner's notion of "mobile projection" is that the image is never "disembodied." The image is intimately connected to emotion and, by extension, intimately connected to physiological processes concomitant with emotion. It is this intimate web of emotion, body and image which makes a change in one of these areas affect all others.

Other European clinicians have used imagery as a basis for their psychotherapeutic work and these include Desoille's directed daydream and Virel's and Fretigny's oneirodrama (Watkins, 1976). The term "oneiros" means "dream" and often Leuner, Desoille's, and Virel's methods are grouped together as waking dream therapies (or oneirotherapies). For a detailed description of these methods the reader is referred to Watkins (1976). The explication of Leuner's guided affective imagery is identical in principle to the other oneirotherapies. "All the oneirotherapeutic methods used extended visual fantasies in narrative form to obtain information about the motivational system of the individual . . . (These were used) in conjunction with associations, discussions and interpretation" (Sheikh & Jordan, 1983, p. 401). As well, the oneirotherapies teach the client techniques of muscle relaxation preparatory to the imagery work, because

clinicians have found that people are more receptive to fantasy material when in a relaxed state. The oneirotherapies have a common theoretical basis as follows (from Watkins, 1976): (a) visual images and inner drama reflect the situation of the client (as well as strengths, weaknesses, attitudes); (b) the unconscious expresses itself creatively through images and offers guidance in the development of the personality; and (c) the conscious experience of participating in the waking dream is itself liberating. The differences among these psychotherapies lies in the amount of structure and guidance applied to the waking dream.

2. Jung's Active Imagination. Jung's active imagination is another technique which falls into the category of waking dream therapy, although its relatively unstructured character makes it unique (Jung, 1964, 1968; Hannah, 1981). There are no standard image scenes employed. The starting point is often a dream image or a painting or anything that makes an impression upon the client. The unfolding of the narrative is completely left up to the client. Ideally, the therapist intervenes as little as possible and is there to monitor the client's progress and help him or her avoid dangerous pitfalls. These pitfalls include becoming overwhelmed and disoriented by the emotional impact of the images.

Barbara Hannah's Encounters with the Soul (1981) clarifies the method and gives in-depth examples of its use. In active imagination, a person interacts with an image or dream figure either by watching the image unfold spontaneously, conversing with it or giving it form such as in dance or drawing. In one example, a woman had a vision as a young girl which instructed her that she was to conceive a son who would be a genius, on the condition that her time of conception be a sexual

encounter entirely without pleasure. This edict dominated her life until at 50 years of age she began conversing with this vision through active imagination. She demanded an explanation of the edict and informed the "vision" of her own wants and needs. As a result, the woman achieved resolution of a life-long neurosis and lived an unusually peaceful old age (see case of Anna Marjula in Hannah, 1981).

Dialoguing with an inner voice or interacting with an imaginary figure are activities which occur spontaneously in people's lives (Jellinek, 1949; Wilson & Barber, 1983). These methods have been used in other psychotherapies as well, including covert conditioning (Cautela, 1977), focussing (Gendlin, 1978), and guided affective imagery (Leuner, 1969).

3. Imagery and Hypnosis. When a person is encouraged to engage in fantasy while very relaxed, it can be said that he or she is actually in a hypnotic state. In the oneirotherapies, one can say that the therapist actually gives hypnotic suggestions (e.g., to see a scene, such as a meadow or a cave). The relationship between hypnosis and imagery overlaps a good deal. In Sheikh and Jordan's review of image therapies, they note that,

. . . several investigators, on the basis of their research, have concluded that hypnosis essentially intensifies the subject's imaginative process. . . . In light of the above evidence, it seems safe to hypothesize that the wide variety of effects produced through hypnosis is due largely to the imagery involved. (Sheikh & Jordan, 1983, p. 410)

A recent publication by Wilson and Barber, two leading researchers of hypnosis, gives convergent evidence that imagery, fantasy and hypnosis are closely related (1983). They interviewed 27 women who had extremely high scores on tests of hypnotic susceptibility and found that all but one "shared a series of interrelated characteristics, a syndrome

or personality type that we are labelling the fantasy-prone personality" (Wilson & Barber, 1983, p. 345). The fantasy-prone personality has an intensely vivid fantasy life where "imagining . . . is as necessary to them as eating and sleeping" (Wilson & Barber, 1983, p. 351). The fantasy is experienced in all sense modalities, often has a hallucinatory-like vividness, and has an "involuntary, self-propelling quality" (Wilson & Barber, 1983, p. 343). One of the subjects was so oblivious to her surroundings while engaged in her dream world that she walked into the middle of a freeway. Another visualized angels on the four corners of her car to prevent her fantasies from intruding on her while driving. The fact that this extraordinary group of people was identified using tests of hypnotic susceptibility suggests that the state in which people experience vivid imagery is closely related to hypnosis. By implication, the image therapies actually induce a hypnotic-like state and thereafter owe some of their efficacy to hypnosis itself.

4. Imagery & Behaviorism. Surprisingly enough, many image techniques have evolved from behavioral methods. In spite of behaviorism's initial disdain for internal mental events, a number of clinicians from this school use imagery to change client's learned responses. Wolpe's systematic desensitization instructs phobic clients to visualize anxiety-provoking events while in a relaxed state (Wolpe, 1973). In doing this, the client learns a new response (relaxation) to a fearful situation and becomes "desensitized" to the frightening stimulus. Meichenbaum's cognitive behavior modification involves rehearsal in imagination of the desired behavior for specific situations (Meichenbaum, 1977). Cautela's covert conditioning is based on the

assumption that covert (or inner, imaginary) behaviors are susceptible to the same principles as overt behaviors: positive reinforcement, extinction, shaping, etc. (Cautela, 1977). In Cautela's covert conditioning, the client learns to alter his or her thought and image process by selectively rewarding (in imagination) specified covert events.

The application of Skinnerian and Pavlovian learning principles to imagery has proved to be useful. These principles demonstrate the functional relationship between imagery and affect and behavior, but they cannot account for the actual nature of imagery itself. For example, behavioral theory cannot explain the symbolic aspects of imagery. In fact, the explicit assumption of behaviorism (which typically describes psychology as a science confining itself to publicly observable events) is violated when principles of conditioning are applied to any imaginary events. Thus, the behavioral image therapies have developed very effective mental techniques without adequately explaining how thought processes are identical to overt behaviors. Are wishes identical to actions? Are images identical to actual events? If so, this suggests that the nature of the mind is rather more magical than perhaps behaviorists would want to admit.

5. Neuro-linguistic Programming. A brief consideration of neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) is a useful adjunct to any study of imagery because it addresses the multi-sensory nature of experience, emphasizing the visual and kinesthetic and auditory modalities. At first glance, the slick packaging and catchy phrases of standard textbooks on this topic (Frogs into Princes, The Structure of Magic) suggest a faddishness that does not merit serious comment. (Example: "...we began the

process of making the magical skills of potent psychotherapists available to other practitioners.") (Grinder & Bandler, 1976, p. 3). However, NLP summarizes clinical insights that are clearly basic to many image therapies.

According to Grinder and Bandler (1976), a person represents his or her experience through one of three sense modalities: visual, kinesthetic or auditory. Each person favors one of these modalities. The "most highly valued representational system can be identified by listening to the natural language predicates used by a person in describing his experience" (Grinder & Bandler, 1976, p. 25). Example: A man who claims "I feel the weight of my problems" is using the kinesthetic modality. Grinder and Bandler state that problems occur when people rely exclusively on one modality, to the extent that information from other channels is blocked. This dependence on one channel limits people's flexibility, causing them to misinterpret their experience and respond to situations in rigidly inappropriate ways. For example, a woman complained that her husband didn't see her (visual) as valuable because whenever she dressed up he just "pawed her" (kinesthetic) and didn't look (Grinder & Bandler, 1976, p. 17). The psychotherapeutic process of NLP consists of extending the client's range of available channels so that he or she can access all the information relevant to experience. In the above example, the woman (who used a visual mode) misinterpreted her husband's response (a kinesthetic one) because it was not her favored mode of communication. Treatment consisted of developing her less-favored function: e.g., "How do you feel as you see your husband not noticing you?" (Ibid., p. 18). In this case, the woman was asked to form an image and then attend to

the bodily sensations which occurred in conjunction with the image.

Overall, NLP is an extensive system of psychotherapy with a multitude of ingenious techniques for analyzing human interaction in terms of information channels and strategies for resolving communication problems. The value of NLP is that it provides a model for accessing all dimensions of imagery experience and gives a much needed warning against using the visual modality exclusively.

6. Other Image Therapies. There are a plethora of other image therapies used which emphasize the symbolic nature of imagery phenomena, and these will be briefly mentioned. In North America, some well known methods employing imagery are Shorr's psycho-imagination therapy (Shorr et al., 1979), Gendlin's focussing (1970, 1978), Rehyer and Smeltzer's emergent uncovering therapy (1968), aspects of Fritz Perl's gestalt therapy (1973) and Assagioli's psychosynthesis (1965, 1973). All of these methods encourage the client to identify and resolve conflicts in symbolic rather than lexical fashion, and all use imagery to a greater or lesser extent.

7. Clinical Image Therapies - Evaluation. All of the image therapies, from oneirotherapy to systematic desensitization to NLP, share one thing in common; they bypass a purely verbal form of communication. The client is required to forego his usual means of describing experience (language) and asked to experiment with sights, sounds and sensations that he or she usually ignores. By attending to these previously ignored kinds of experiences, the person's resources for solving problems are increased. Implicitly, then, imagery becomes a form of non-rational (non-lexical) thinking.

The reasons given for the efficacy of imagery in psychotherapy vary

as widely as the therapies themselves. There is no consensus on how these products of the imagination come to have such startling practical effects on the lives of clients. Some, such as Cautela (1977) and Wolpe (1973), deny the essential difference between imagery events and those that are publicly observable. Others, such as Jung (1964) or Leuner (1969), emphasize the central role of imagery because of its connection to the center of the personality, the soul.

Research on the physiological changes which occur during imagery (Jacobsen, 1929, 1930, previously reviewed) supports the clinical reports of therapeutic change. If the act of imagining actually produces neuro-muscular changes, then the client is virtually engaged in a physiological preparation for new emotions and behaviors. However, physiology does not account for the specific form of an individual's image or the meaning a client assigns to it, nor does it explain the transformational character of the images themselves or their symbolic dimension.

Overall, the clinical uses of imagery collectively demonstrate (a) the changeable nature of the images themselves, (b) the specificity of individual responses to imagery, (c) the importance of imagery as a rehearsal for new feelings and behaviors, (d) the connection between bodily sensations and imagery, and (e) the reciprocity between imagery and emotion.

D. Eidetic Imagery Research

1. Overview of Eidetic Research. Eidetic imagery comes from the Greek word "eidōs," meaning "form, that which is seen." In summarizing research on the characteristics of eidetic imagery, Richardson (1969) specifies the following qualities: eidetic imagery is percept-like

imagery distinguished by the presence of vivid details; it is projected onto an external surface; it can be scanned as if objectively present; people "seeing" eidetic imagery describe it in the present tense; eidetic imagery persists for a length of time; and the color of an eidetic is positive (i.e., similar to the stimulus object). Purdy (1936) has discussed the possibility that eidetic imagery may occur in auditory, olfactory and tactile modalities. (An example of auditory eidetic imagery would be pitch-perfect hearing.)

Eidetic imagery research first began in the 1930s with a German psychologist, Urbantschitsch, who founded a clinic devoted to the study of this subject. His research focussed on the special qualities of the eidetiker (the person who has eidetic imagery) and he searched intensively but fruitlessly for the distinctive personality characteristics of these people (see Ahsen, 1977b).

Since its inception, research on eidetic imagery has been fraught with confusion about the most basic questions, and this confusion persists until the present time. There has been little or no agreement in answer to the following questions:

1. Does eidetic imagery exist? If so, what is it?
2. Are there distinctive characteristics of eidetic imagery? If so, what are they?
3. Is eidetic imagery rare or common? Is it a special ability possessed by a few people or is it a potential that all people have and can be trained to use?
4. Are there distinguishing characteristics of people who have eidetic imagery?
5. What is the best method of eliciting and studying eidetic

imagery?

The lack of agreement about the very nature and existence of eidetic imagery has been a researcher's nightmare. One title of an article on the subject calls it a "will-o'-the-wisp" (Doob, 1966). It seems that whenever stringent criteria are used, eidetic imagery is strait-jacketed out of existence. Whenever criteria are loosened, eidetic imagery seems to merge into other kinds of imagery, so that it is no longer worthwhile to identify a specific eidetic imagery phenomenon. In the following discussion, it can be seen that eidetic research has attempted to strike a balance between these two extremes.

In a typical test situation for eidetic imagery there are two easels set in front of the subject; one with the stimulus picture and the other left blank. The person is asked to examine the stimulus picture for a specified length of time and then asked to look at the blank surface and report anything there. An eidetiker will "see" a vivid, detailed picture take shape on the blank surface (Haber & Haber, 1964). Some of the variables controlled for in this method are: length of time the picture is examined; distance and angle of the easel; number and detail of researcher's questions about the eidetic image; accuracy of subject's answers; and presence of eye movements during the subject's report (eye movements indicate an eidetic is being scanned) (Haber & Haber, 1964; Doob, 1965). Other variables tested using this method are: quality of the stimulus picture (e.g., contrast, complexity, intrinsic interest); influence of background surface of blank easel (e.g., color, texture) on image; influence of sudden noises and other events in the environment during the test (Allport, 1924, Haber & Haber, 1964; Kluver, 1928; Richardson, 1969).

Another method of testing for eidetic ability involves assigning the subject a seemingly impossible memory task. In one study, a man recalled a complicated mathematical formula after 10 years (Luria, 1960). In another, a subject demonstrated memory of a random pattern of 10,000 dots after 24 hours (Stromeyer, 1970). Still another method involved giving subjects two different pictures to image, and then asking the subjects to superimpose the pictures. The pictures were drawn in such a way that a third scene emerged when they were superimposed. Eidetikers have successfully identified the third scene when doing this task (Haber & Haber as reported in Segal, 1971). The same technique has been used with two separate random dot patterns (Stromeyer, 1970).

The incidence of eidetic imagery appears to vary with the methods used to identify it. The first studies, using the easel and picture method, concentrated on primary school children and generally found a 20% incidence of eidetic imagery (Haber & Haber, 1964). A recent study of pre-schoolers also found that 20% of the children had eidetic ability, according to Haber's procedure (Paine, 1980). The incidence for adults is reported to be much lower, an estimated .1% (Haber, 1979). In a study where adults were hypnotically age-regressed and given an eidetic task--a combination of 10,000 dot stereogram--the incidence was found to be .42% (Wallace, 1978). All of the subjects who succeeded on the task reported having eidetic experiences as children (Wallace, 1978). However, another study using the same method found that no subjects were able to successfully complete the task (Spanos, 1979). Thus, reports vary from no reported cases of eidetic imagery to 20% of school-age children with the ability. Not surprisingly, a higher

incidence is reported in studies which use less demanding tasks.

Eidetic imagery research has been unsuccessful in clearly discriminating between after-imagery, memory imagery and eidetic imagery. The best discussion of this problem is to be found in Richardson (1969) and is summarized below. Overall, eidetic imagery is thought to share some qualities of both after-images and memory images, occupying an intermediate position between these two. After-images are due to stimulus conditions of the retina, as for example when one "sees" a bolt of lightning on a dark night seconds after it has flashed.

After-images can also occur when the eye gazes at a repetitive stimulus (such as picking berries all day) or when a person stares fixedly at an object and then glances away. Characteristics of after-imagery include the following: it is seen like a percept is seen (external location); it moves with the eyes; it varies in size when projected to different distances (Emmert's law); it may appear in complementary colors.

Eidetic imagery is similar to after-imagery in that it has a sensory quality like a percept, and an external location (although this last point is debatable). It may appear in complementary colors, although it usually does not. Eidetic imagery is different from after-imagery in that it persists longer, can be evoked by more complex stimuli, does not move with the eye (the eye scans the eidetic) (Haber & Haber, 1964), and the image remains constant in size (Richardson, 1969).

A memory image is the "common and familiar imagery of everyday life" (Richardson, 1969). It accompanies recall of events and ongoing thought processes. It is often incomplete, usually unstable, has a brief duration and is indefinitely localized. Eidetic imagery is similar to memory imagery because forms and shapes are retained, it is

not dependent upon stimulus conditions of the retina, the image does not move with the eye, and the subject can refer to the image when responding to questions about it. Eidetic imagery is different from memory imagery because there is extended preservation of detail and vividness and the external localization gives a perceptual quality to the stimulus. Many studies have been devoted to the task of isolating eidetic imagery from visual memory (Paivio, 1979; Miller & Peacock, 1982; Wasinger et al., 1982) and results indicate that eidetic imagery is a phenomenon distinct from visual recall. There are probably varying degrees of eidetic imagery ranging from weak to strong, with the extreme case of an eidetiker demonstrating a unique phenomena distinct from both after-imagery and visual memory. "The extreme eidetiker/mnemonist may voluntarily produce constructions which mimic perceptual experience, even showing sensory qualities" (Segal, 1971).

In a landmark retrospective article called "20 years of Haunting Eidetic Imagery: Where's the Ghost?" Haber, a major researcher in the field of eidetics, reflected on his work (1979). He came to the following conclusions after decades of intensive research:

1. Eidetic children distinguish between seeing and remembering.
2. Eidetic imagery is not photographic memory and the author urges that the accuracy of recall criteria be dropped.
3. Eidetic children prevent images from forming by active, cognitive verbal rehearsal of material (e.g., verbally listing elements of the stimulus picture).
4. Sometimes three dimensional eidetic images are reported.
5. Haber's estimate of the frequency is that from 2% - 5% of elementary school children have eidetic abilities.

6. Eidetic children cannot be distinguished from other children on the basis of personality characteristics or school achievement.

7. Eidetic ability tends to be stable. Of the original 12 children classed as eidetic by Haber (1964), only one was later reclassified as non-eidetic.

8. Eidetic ability is extremely rare in adults - less than 1%.

9. There is little evidence for the following hypotheses about eidetic imagery:

a) that eidetic imagery is an immature form of memory which is replaced by a more sophisticated mnemonic system that includes semantic labels at a later age (the developmental hypothesis)

b) that eidetic imagery is related to neurological deficits.

10. Eidetic imagery is a unique phenomenon, discontinuous from other forms of imagery.

Haber notes ruefully that after spending 20 years researching this topic he still knows very little about the actual phenomenon. This near-fruitless expenditure of energy causes him to question the assumptions and methods that he and other psychologists have used to approach eidetics. He concludes:

Experimental studies tell us nothing about the phenomenology of visual imagery and even less about individual differences in such subjective states. . . . The ghost of eidetic imagery is the fear of phenomenology. Psychologists in general, and perception researchers in particular, have invested enormous energy in developing methodologies in which we never have to trust what the subject says. . . . when we believe that we can discover and understand all the rules of perception by treating the subject as a null indicator, then we must fail. The study of visual imagery is perhaps the clearest case of this failure. (Haber, 1979, p. 594) [underline added]

Thus, the research on eidetic imagery suffers from the same oversights as laboratory task research. It has attempted to identify the phenomena by measuring the relationship between independent and dependent variables, but these measures give little information about the experience of imagery itself. Consequently, the research has proven to be of little help in understanding what happens during eidetic imagery. The reported perceptual character of eidetic imagery led the researchers to use a philosophy and method appropriate to publicly observable events. However, the fact that no one can see another person's image was neglected. The real problem in research on eidetic imagery is the adoption of a methodology that is inappropriate to the phenomena. An elaborate taxonomy of characteristics peculiar to eidetic imagery has been tested, mostly unsuccessfully, and all without serious consideration of the subjective experience of the imager. As Haber pointed out, procedures which neglect this very important aspect of eidetic imagery are premature and doomed to fail.

2. Akhter Ahsen's Eidetic Psychotherapy. Ahsen's interest in eidetic imagery focusses on the images themselves and their significance to the imager. His use of the word "eidetic" is very different than that of the researchers in the previous section. Ahsen characterizes the work of Haber and others as "typographic eidetic imagery" (Ahsen, 1977b). The typological school of eidetic imagery "uses only subjects who are specially gifted in eidetic imagery and employs externally presented pictures" (Ahsen, 1977b, p. 23). In contrast, Ahsen's eidetics come under the rubric of the "structural school," which "studies the eidetic in its dynamic structuring form which is revealed under various conditions . . . (these eidetics) have been extensively reported by

individuals who are not necessarily eidetikers" (Ahsen, 1977b, p. 21) and most closely resemble "inner subjective visions" (Muller, 1826 in Ahsen, 1977b). Richardson has irritably remarked in a recent article that Ahsen's use of the word eidetic actually refers to "spontaneous images of fantasy" (Richardson, 1983), and he issues Ahsen a scolding on the sloppy use of language. However, as mentioned previously, after 20 years of research on the topic no consensus has been reached on the existence, nature or definitive characteristics of eidetic imagery and therefore, Ahsen's definition of "eidetic" does not exactly violate some standard formulation.

The distinction between the typological and structural schools may in fact be spurious. The distinction is based on (a) a notion that some images occur "in the mind's eye" while others are more like hallucinations, and (b) the notion that eidetic ability must be demonstrated by accurate reproduction of a recent stimulus. As Haber (1979) has pointed out, the usefulness and necessity of these criteria are not borne out by research. The division of eidetics into typological and structural schools may be more useful in describing researchers' assumptions and methods than in describing characteristics of eidetics themselves.

For Ahsen,

Eidetics are related to natural potentials of the psychological organism and the phenomena of nature itself . . . (T)he experience of a natural sensation . . . represents . . . truth in a fundamental form, an original pastoral contact with the phenomena of nature itself. It would indeed be fascinating to know how nature appears in the mind without the intervention of conscious superstructures.

(Ahsen, 1977b, p. 21)

The implication is that the eidetic is an image which captures an original perception. It is an immediate contact with the environment

uncontaminated by conscious opinions and values. It represents the person's uniquely personal response to his or her world. Ahsen's approach to eidetic imagery is implicitly a phenomenological one because he begins by attending to the experience of the imager, rather than to measureable characteristics of the image.

One's response to the world is most original and true during childhood, before social standards and collective opinions have overlaid experience. According to Ahsen, childhood experiences provide a rich source of eidetic images (Ahsen 1972, 1973, 1977a). Ahsen postulates that a person's developmental conflicts are encoded in three-part eidetic form, as follows: (a) image (I); (b) somatic response (S) which is a set of bodily feelings and tensions; and (c) meaning (M) to the client. Whenever Ahsen refers to an eidetic, he assumes that a full eidetic incorporates all aspects of image (I); somatic response (S), and meaning (M) (otherwise known as ISM). According to Ahsen,

... the eidetic can be defined as a normal subjective visual image which is experienced with pronounced vividness: although not necessarily evoked at the time of the experience by an actual external object, and not necessarily dependent on a previous experience of an actual situation, it is 'seen' inside the mind or outside in the literal sense of the word, and this 'seeing' is accompanied by certain somatic events as well as a feeling of meaning; the total experience in all its dimensions excludes the possibility that it is pathological.
(Ahsen, 1977b, p. 6)

Children tend to encode their developmental conflicts in eidetic fashion because their limited power and understanding makes it difficult for them to resolve certain problems posed by experience. It is as if the eidetic preserved a kernel of experience in original form, which can be accessed through the image at a later date. For example, children witnessing their parents fighting might encode this event as follows:

Image (I) - two faces shouting; somatic response (S) - tightening of the chest; meaning (M) - when people fight I am afraid, I can't breathe. When the event is too frightening or disturbing to "digest" whole, children, and later, adults may have access to only one aspect of the eidetic--most commonly the image. However, unresolved aspects of the event may exert an influence on adults' present day experiences and cause problems. [Note: This is similar to Penfield's suggestion that the interpretive cortex accesses memories which are relevant to current experience (1963).] For example, a man may be afflicted with severe chest pains after a quarrel with his wife, which is an expression of the somatic element (S) of the original experience of parents fighting. In eidetic psychotherapy, clients are taught how to access all parts of their experience (through the eidetic, or ISM) and taught how to use the image to resolve "unfinished business." In the above example, both the original image (I) and meaning (M) of parental conflict has been "forgotten."

The eidetic image "encapsulates" experience in a unitary fashion (ISM). The ISM elements exist as a whole but the original breaks into component parts under conditions of stress and conflict. When the ISM is only partially preserved, there is a gap between the actual experience and the client's awareness of that experience. In the above example there is a gap between the man's awareness of chest pains and his deeper experience of the threatening nature of conflict ("when people fight I'm afraid, I can't breathe"). This can lead to the client's denial of obvious meanings in the eidetic. If so, there is a "consciousness-imagery gap" (Ahsen, 1972, 1977a). When the image, somatic state and meaning elements of the image are re-unified, and when

the consciousness-imagery gap (CIG) is eradicated, there is increased awareness and healing (Ahsen, 1977). Thus, the eidetic has developmental components (both of childhood and developmental crises in adulthood) and curative possibilities attached to it.

The eidetic image changes and transforms according to its own inner laws, which Ahsen speaks of as "incipient tendencies" (Ahsen, 1973). Because the eidetic is not merely a photographic reproduction of past experience but comprises the individual's emotional response to an event, it cannot be altered willfully. The ingrained emotional response does not change on command but can be transformed through the client's recognition and integration of his feelings towards the ISM event. This is similar to Leuner's notion of mobile projection (1969). The "incipient tendencies" of the image are channels for emotional transformation. Thus, the eidetic image will change and transform only as the client's emotional and bodily response to the event also changes and transforms. According to Ahsen, if the image can be easily altered any which way, this is an indication that the image is not a true eidetic (1972). Therefore, a key characteristic of eidetic imagery is some element of autonomy of the image.

The dynamic structure of eidetic images also involves a bi-polar configuration of positive and negative elements in the same image. This is because "the ego sees all events as ego positive or ego negative entities and centralizes them around two opposed nuclei . . . the ego confirms one of the poles and leaves the other to take care of itself" (Ahsen, 1973, p. 121). Ahsen describes a woman who suffered from a phobia which prevented her from being alone for even one minute (see Ahsen, 1973). She was haunted by a childhood incident which took place

in India. She had seen a ghost when passing the cemetery, and the adults listening to her story suggested the doll she kept by her side had an evil spirit which caused the apparition. This was the "negative pole" of her experience. The doll was discarded. During treatment, the woman recalled other more positive and helpful things about her doll. It was a constant companion during a very lonely childhood and its presence had actually given her courage when she saw the ghost. When she imagined this beloved companion beside her, her fears (and phobias) subsided. In this example, the woman was haunted by the negative elements of the image--her uncertainty and inability to trust her doll under the force of the adults' persuasions. When she recovered her own more positive perceptions of her companion she regained her courage. It is the neglected pole, or unrecognized aspect of the experience encoded in ISM that must be developed for change to occur, and for the original flexibility of the psyche to be restored. Much of the eidetic psychotherapy involves engaging the client in recognizing the neglected "pole" of the encoded experience. For additional fascinating examples of how this is achieved, the reader is referred to Basic Concepts in Eidetic Imagery (Ahsen, 1973).

Ahsen states that the individual's primary experience is one of relationship to caregivers, typically parents. Therefore each person can be expected to have eidetic images of his or her parents (Ahsen, 1972). Children cannot grow and develop without encountering frustrations with their parents and inevitably they have developmental conflicts with regard to them. The eidetic images of parents are not memory-copies but rather they encode fundamental experiences of the child's relationship with the mother and father. Ahsen has developed

the Eidetic Parents Test in order to explore the individual eidetic images of mother and father (1972, 1977a, 1977b). The test consists of a series of images wherein the client is asked to see the parent in various situations and to attend to various aspects of the image. The full test consists of 30 image situations, as follows:

... (1) how and where the parents appear in the house in which the patient was raised; (2) the left-right position of the parental figures in front of the patient; (3) whether the parents look separated or united as a couple in the picture; (4) the feeling of an active-passive relationship between the two figures; (5) which parent seems to run faster in the image; (6) pattern and purpose of the parents' running in the picture; (7) the freedom of the parental limbs while running; (8) the comparative brilliance of the parental eyes; (9) the object orientation of the parental eyes; (10) the parental eyes--feelings they give, story they tell; (11) the comparative loudness of the parental voices in the picture; (12) the degree of meaningfulness in the parental voices; (13) the parental voices--the feelings they give, story they tell; (14) the degree of hearing by the parental ears in the picture; (15) the degree of understanding by the parental ears when they hear the patient speaking to them; (16) the parents sniffing the house atmosphere, suggestive of whether they like or dislike the house; (17) the feeling of personal warmth imparted by the parental bodies in the picture; (18) the feeling of acceptance or rejection felt in respect of the parental skin; (19) how healthy the parental skin appears in the picture; (20) the extent to which the parents extend their arms to the patient; (21) the extent to which the patient extends his arms to receive from the parents; (22) the comparative strength of the parental hand grasp in the picture; (23) the manner of the parents swallowing food; (24) the manner of the parents drinking fluid; (25) the pressure in the parental jaws while biting something; ~~(26) the~~ temperature of the parental brains; (27) the efficiency or inefficiency of the parental brains when visualized as thinking machines; (28) the beating of the parental hearts, seen through a window visualized in the chest; (29) the appearance of the parental intestines, visualized in their abdomens; (30) the temperature and appearance of the parental genitals and their reaction to the patient's touching them in the image. (Ahsen, 1972, p. 27)

From the image responses to the test, areas of conflict can be diagnosed. The images which are distorted in some fashion (e.g., parent is excessively large, or small, or with limbs missing) indicate problem

areas and are used as a springboard for therapy. Often, the client is prescribed a positive image or is given instructions on how to interact with and improve the distorted image. The EPT is used in this way for both diagnosis and treatment of psychological problems.

Akhter Ahsen's work actually draws both from eidetic imagery research and the oneirotherapies. The basis of his work is the vivid, repeatable image of an original perception--the eidetic. However, the methods that are used with the clients are similar in many respects to Leuner's guided affective imagery and other oneirotherapies, in that the therapist uses standard image scenes for diagnosis, makes suggestions to the client about how to interact with the image, and often prescribes a positive image for the client to contemplate.

3. Present Study's Use of Ahsen's Eidetic Parents' Test. Much of Ahsen's published work involves detailed explanations of how to use the Eidetic Parents' Test in therapy. He has many ingenious techniques for working with imagery and makes profound commentaries on how images reveal the nature of the human psyche. The present study, however, uses only a small portion of his work, the first few steps of the Eidetic Parents' Test (EPT), and does not necessarily ascribe to Ahsen's theoretical framework.

The purpose of the present study is to describe the subjective experience of imagery, eidetic imagery in particular. In effect, this thesis answers Haber's 1979 challenge to trust what the subject says and to brave the ghost of eidetic imagery, which is phenomenology. Ahsen's EPT holds promise as a tool for phenomenological research in imagery because:

1. It developed out of clinical interest in the subjective aspect

of eidetics.

2. The standard scenes elicit repeatable instances of imagery. This makes the experience of imagery easier to describe (as opposed to fleeting images) and provides the possibility of returning to the experience to examine it in greater depth.

3. The EPT content is familiar and accessible. Almost everyone has had a relationship with a major caregiver and therefore images pertaining to this content should be available to almost everyone.

4. The common subject (parents) and structured exercises of the EPT provide a basis of comparison and distillation of essential elements of a particular imagery event.

To some degree, the phenomenological method is already part of Ahsen's work because he systematically elicits detailed responses to a specific imagery experience. However, his purpose in using the EPT is essentially a diagnostic one--to reveal the dynamics of the relationship to the parents and thereby discern clients' favored modes of interacting with others, as well as clients' general ability to cope with problems.

The present study uses a more purely phenomenological approach than Ahsen and concentrates on the actual experience of eidetic imagery. Through collecting descriptions of people's experiences of eidetic imagery in response to the EPT and systematically examining and re-examining them, the essential structure of this experience may be revealed. If the results show that image, somatic response and meaning component (ISM) are the essential ingredients of eidetic imagery, this would be a phenomenological validation of Ahsen's theory. If the investigation yields other information, then the essential structure of the eidetic image is clarified.

III. THE PARADIGM PROBLEM

Before describing the present study in detail, it is necessary to set phenomenology within the context of scientific research in general. There are at least two different paradigms possible for psychology: a human science approach (which subsumes phenomenology) and a natural science approach. The premises underlying each paradigm differ radically from each other, a fact which is not always appreciated. In order to clarify the matter, the following discussion will describe natural science and human science in the broadest possible context.

Psychology suffers from a paradigm problem which is more keenly felt by some members of the profession than others. Kuhn has popularized the notion of paradigm in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and he defines paradigms as "universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners" (Kuhn, 1962, p. viii). The paradigm provides a model or framework to use in defining scientific problems and it is a "pre-requisite to perception itself" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 113). The paradigm determines what problems to study (the "problem-field," Kuhn, p. 103), what methods to use, and it is the source of criteria for successful solutions. A scientific revolution occurs when there is a shift of professional commitment from one paradigm to another. A revolution is triggered by the "reigning paradigm's" inability to explain anomalies which challenge the paradigm itself. The fundamental object of a scientific revolution is to "urge a change in the perception and evaluation of familiar data" (Kuhn, 1962, p. viii). Thus, a paradigm is a network of conceptual and theoretical

commitments that determine how a problem is perceived, what data is relevant to the problem, and how that data is evaluated.

As suggested earlier, psychology suffers from a fundamental problem: there is spirited disagreement over which paradigm is most appropriate for psychology as a science. The disagreement stems from competing "images of man." The two approaches will be called "natural science" and "human science." (Phenomenological psychology is one of the human sciences.) Stigliano (1986) argues persuasively that these two approaches are distinguished by radically different ontologies. He points out that natural scientific research assumes "a basic neutral human nature" (Stigliano, 1986, p. 33), which is in keeping with natural science's effort to describe man as an object in nature, following the same laws and principles as other natural phenomena. However, this approach "either ignores the moral nature of human action or ignores meaning, emotion and purpose" (Stigliano, 1986, p. 34). The human sciences favor an ontology which encompasses meaning and purposiveness, and they also emphasize the historical and cultural context of human action.

The paradigm debate hinges on the question "Can the methods of natural science be adapted to the study of man?" (Koch, 1973, p. 83). Koch points out that unfortunately this hypothesis has been interpreted as an a priori truth (Koch, 1973). The proponents of a human science approach feel the debate most keenly because they are in a minority, and because the very nature of their objections is not appreciated. Too often the human science approach is dismissed as methodologically invalid and shockingly lax in experimental rigor. These criticisms betray a lack of understanding of the radical nature of the differences

between natural science and human science, which begin at a philosophical level. These biases determine assumptions about the nature of man, the problem field, and relevant methodology.

As Kuhn notes wryly,

The proponents of competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other needs to make its case. (Kuhn, 1963, p. 148)

The differences at the level of non-empirical assumptions need to be articulated before an adequate distinction can be made between a natural science approach and a human science one. Many psychologists have presented insightful discussions on the differences between the two paradigms, including Colaizzi (1978), Giorgi (1975), Koch (1973), Romanyshyn (1978, 1982), and Van Kaam (1966). However, these discussions are difficult to synthesize without extremely broad organizing concepts. As a result, natural science will be compared to human science along dimensions adapted from Rychlak (1968, 1977), who has made the most comprehensive analysis of the fundamental differences between the two approaches. The following exposition carefully identifies the dimensions along which the two approaches can be compared and, by implication, indicates the appropriate grounds for criticism of human science research projects.

A. Historical Context: Locke and Kant

In the broadest possible sense, it can be said that Locke (1632 - 1704) and Kant (1724 - 1804) are predecessors to the natural science and human science paradigms respectively (see Rychlak, 1969, 1977). The philosophies of each of these men will be characterized briefly to give a sense of their different "images of man." Following this, dimensions of comparison for the two paradigms will be presented.

Locke suggested that the mind is a "tabula rasa" - a blank slate - which functions as a receptor for sensory input. The mind has no inherent structure of its own but rather records impressions from the empirical world, thereby etching marks on the blank slate. In Locke's philosophy, the sensory world "out there" is primary and meaning is to be found in the interrelationship of things in the empirical world. The mind copies the basic facts of sensory experience as "simple ideas" which can be combined in various ways to form complex ideas. Simple ideas are the basic building blocks of thought and can only be derived from the outside world. Therefore, the mind does not ever create anything truly new but merely functions to receive and systematize sense impressions. Locke's philosophy underlies much of psychological research today, and as a "natural scientific" model, it treats man just like any object in the environment.

Kant overturns Locke's approach to the mind and sensory objects. Whereas Locke would hold that the mind is nothing but an empty vessel for sensory perceptions, Kant asserts that these very sense impressions would be unintelligible were it not for the mind's capacity to organize them in a meaningful way. He suggested that there was a pre-existing structure of the mind, composed of mental categories (such as unity, plurality, possibility) and these "categories of reason" make sense of the external world. In Kant's view, the mind is "pro forma": it takes an active role in making sensory perceptions meaningful.

... mind never knows 'things in themselves' (noumena) but deals only with sensory representations (phenomena) mediated by the understanding. (Kant in Rychlak, 1968, p. 280)

Kant does not discount the external world as a source of knowledge but he emphasizes that this is not the only source. Knowledge can be

obtained by means of sensory input and it is also "given in the structure of intellect" (Rychlak, 1968, p. 280) itself by virtue of the pre-existing mental categories. In Kant's view, then, knowledge does not necessarily have a referent to external sensory objects.

According to Kant, ideas are not simply copies of facts in the outside world (as per Locke), but rather exist as prototypes within the mind. When the sense impressions seem to "match" the mind's prototype, then the idea is activated and used. Some ideas transcend sensory knowledge and cannot be immediately demonstrated. A good example of this is the early Greeks' suggestion that matter is composed of essential elements called atoms. This idea existed in the mind as a prototype of the structure of matter and has only recently been demonstrated to be true. Kant's emphasis on the active nature of the mind, the importance of the experiencing person, and the pitfalls of over-valuing the sensory world as a source of knowledge, is a forerunner of the principles of human sciences today.

B. Natural Science and Human Science: Dimensions of Comparison

1. Demonstrative Versus Dialectical Reasoning. The first dimension identifies two different processes which can be used in human reasoning. Natural science relies on demonstrative reasoning, which begins by stating a premise that is "primary and true," either by virtue of tautology (e.g., bachelors are unmarried males) or by demonstrating the truth of the statement via sense experience. The argument proceeds in one direction: from the major premise to a logically deduced conclusion (Rychlak, 1968, 1977). The human sciences allow for dialectical reasoning which begins by suggesting an alternative to a stated premise. It is a "procedure of questioning [of either oneself or

others] to bring out items of knowledge which . . . (are) carried by all men within their intellects, and which could be located if one had the proper method" (Rychlak, 1968, p. 257). Dialectical reasoning proceeds by way of opposition and contradiction, it is multidirectional. Demonstrative reasoning requires some referent to truth "in the outside world" while dialectical reasoning holds that truth can be found within the mind itself. To posit that "water expands when frozen" and to deduce from this statement other properties of water is to reason demonstratively. A dialectical enterprise starts with a question, such as "What is the nature of anger?", which could be answered with "It is a violent emotion." The dialectic begins with a response suggesting an opposite, or an alternative, such as "Are there not occasions when anger is felt dimly, when it is not violent?" The discourse proceeds until there is some resolution or synthesis of the many aspects of anger.

The distinction between these two types of reasoning is important because some subject matters are more accurately handled by one type of reasoning only, and this issue is at the crux of paradigm problems in time. Demonstrative reasoning is well suited to establishing the truth or falsity of a suggested causal relationship (e.g., frustration leads to anger). However, the contemplation of the experience of anger is more suitably handled by dialectical reasoning, which can posit multifold aspects of the entity in question.

2. Realism Versus Idealism. Realism is the assertion that the world has an existence independent of the person who examines it (Rychlak, 1968, p. 17), and is a basic tenet of natural science. Knowledge consists of observing the lawful relationships which exist in nature, and meaning is therefore "outside," in the external world. The

human sciences make allowances for a more idealistic view. Idealism holds that it is not useful to speak of an "external world" because this world is known via the perception and cognition of the person witnessing it. Therefore, only the reality of perception and cognition is viable; it is the inner world of the witnessing person that counts. Knowledge accrues as this person actively constructs his or her perceptions into meaningful units.

3. Objective Versus Subjective. The objective versus subjective dimension is well explained in Rychlak's analysis and serves to clear up fuzzy-headed thinking on the topic (Rychlak, 1968).

As we shall use the term "objective," it will refer to the view that abstractions and hence the relationship between abstractions, transcend the individual abstractor, and may be grasped or understood by all individuals in a specified class. (Rychlak, 1968, p. 22)

What is "grasped or understood by all individuals in a specified class" does not have to be a "real" object. Objectivity refers to a "common meaning," to a consensus about the meaning of certain abstractions.

Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist, describes it as:

That very special kind of objectivity which characterizes science, namely that we are quite sure we understand one another and that we can check up on one another. (In Rychlak 1968, p. 23)

Objectivity is possible only when there is shared meaning. Colaizzi (1978), Giorgi (1975), and Van Kaam (1966) have also discussed this notion of objectivity.

In contrast, subjectivity implies an abstraction that is idiosyncratic and incommunicable. The subjective is unique, isolated and cannot be known fully except by the subject in question.

Rychlak and others (see above) deftly avoid confusing "objectivity"

with "objective reality" and take pains to separate the realism versus idealism issue from the objective versus subjective issue. With an emphasis on the consensual nature of objectivity, there is the possibility that by virtue of shared meaning one can be objective about psychological experiences that have no observable referent. The human science psychologists make use of this idea as they attempt to describe the "shared meaning" of experiences such as anger or forgiveness.

4. Extraspection Versus Introspection.

The extraspectively-inclined theorist begins from the proposition: 'What do we - over here as observers - need to postulate in order to study that over there?' (Rychlak, 1968, p. 27)

Such theorists are always in the role of observer and formulate their ideas from the outside looking in, and this characterizes a natural scientific view. A theorist who takes an introspective position, however, develops ideas from the point of view of the object of study. To introspect is to take the "client seriously, as an integral aspect of the process of theory formulation" (Rychlak, 1968, p. 27). The human sciences focus on the experiencing person and are thus introspective (see also Becker, 1986; Giorgi, 1975; and Salner, 1986).

5. Theory-Method Distinction. A theory is a web of propositions which asserts a relationship between a number of ideas. A theory is of necessity philosophical because it asserts the assumptions and postulates that are needed to situate data within a context. Method is the means by which evidence for the theory is demonstrated (see Rychlak, 1968, 1977). The best method for adducing evidence in a natural science approach is the experiment. An experiment attempts to identify the relationship between two variables (independent and dependent variable) by systematically varying one of them (i.e., the independent variable).

Control of the experimental conditions is of utmost importance because researchers must be able to predict the outcome based on the variable they choose to manipulate, without contamination by extraneous influences. Repeated and consistent observations are needed to prove the causal relationship being studied. Because the experimental method rests on a philosophy which uses demonstrative reasoning, all variables must be operationally defined, i.e., have reference to the external world. An operational definition of anger, for example, would have to translate that emotion into precise, measureable terms, such as readings of galvanic skin response. However, as Romanyshyn (1978) points out, the measures of galvanic skin response actually derive their meaning from the researcher's access to his or her own experience of anger. The "external" numbers are interpreted within the context of a common "internal" experience (anger), and without reference to this common experience, the numbers are meaningless.

The experimental method cannot describe experience directly because it establishes causal relationships between variables which are translated from experience into observable entities. Human scientists claim that too much is lost in such a translation.

The supremacy of the experimental method as a way of adducing evidence and the insistence on operational definitions has led to a tyranny of method over theory (see Giorgi 1975). The result is that important human experiences such as love or trust are neglected because they do not lend themselves easily to experimental validation. The human sciences use a more descriptive approach, which will be described in more detail in the next chapter.

The experimental method is part of the natural scientific paradigm,

which makes non-empirical assumptions about the nature of man (Colaizzi, 1978; Romanyshyn, 1982; Stigliano, 1986, Van Kaam, 1966). When a piece of research is criticized for lack of experimental rigor, this is a criticism of method. If, however, the research is based upon a human science paradigm, such criticism is invalid, because it is the non-empirical assumptions at the level of theory that have to be challenged. Differences at the level of philosophy cannot be proven or disproven by experiment, because the experiment itself is a method embedded in a Lockean philosophy. For additional information on theory-method distinction in natural science, the reader is referred to Bohm, 1974, 1980; Kuhn, 1962; Matson, 1973; and Monod, 1972.

C. Human Science Paradigm

The unifying theme of the human science approach is self-reflective awareness (Tageson, 1982) and it underlies the work of a broad spectrum of psychologists, including Giorgi, 1975; Maslow, 1968; May, 1969; Perls, 1973; Rogers, 1961; Van Kaam, 1966; and others.

The major interests of human science psychology emphasize (a) the experiencing person, (b) distinctly human qualities such as choice and responsibility, (c) meaningfulness in the selection of research problems, and (d) the dignity, worth and potential of each person (Matson, 1973).

Phenomenology lies squarely in the camp of human science because it incorporates these principles. In asserting that there are distinctly human qualities to be considered in the study of psychology, phenomenological psychologists call attention to a discontinuity between man and nature (Colaizzi, 1978). Because of this discontinuity, phenomenologists hold that the natural scientific research paradigm

(which assumes that man can be studied like any other object in nature) is not entirely appropriate for the study of psychology, and therefore another paradigm for research must be developed, one which can explicate — distinctively human qualities. The premises from which a phenomenological psychologist begins are fundamentally different from those of a natural scientist. The basic dimensions of phenomenology — are indicated as follows: (a) dialectical reasoning has a part to play in the understanding of humanity; (b) idealism — the structure of the mind organizes sense impressions, and therefore the world "out there" cannot be separated from the person experiencing it; (c) objectivity is shared meaning and one can be objective about things that have no observable referent; (d) introspective — ideas are developed from the point of view of the experiencing person; and (e) theory — method distinction — phenomenology makes non-empirical assumptions about the nature of man and the nature of mind which resemble Kant's philosophy more than Locke's. As a result, phenomenology uses research methods — which are alternatives to the experimental and quantitative methods currently in vogue.

IV. BASIC CONCEPTS IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Phenomenological psychology developed through the works of Brentano, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty (Polkinghorne, 1982; Valle & King, 1978; Rychlak, 1968, 1977). These "philosopher psychologists" grappled with the nature of consciousness and how best to describe it. Their work was complemented by the existential philosophers, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre and others, who asserted that there are certain givens of experience such as death, finiteness, choice and the power to act, and that one's response to these human givens describes one's Being (Jaspers, 1971; Misiak and Sexton, 1973; Yalom, 1980). The story of the development of phenomenology is too complex to be given adequate treatment here and for historical overview of the subject, the reader is referred to Polkinghorne (1982), Misiak and Sexton (1973) and Van Kaam (1966). The previous discussion about the paradigm problem in psychology provides a context for understanding how the development of phenomenology came to have such radically different motives and methods than those of natural science. It is important to remember that the two different modes constitute alternative paradigms, and not simply different methods.

On this note, the writer cautions that the word "phenomenology" is often bandied about in a loose fashion. Any method which makes a concession to the experiencing subject--such as content-analysis, Q-sort, semantic differential--has been called phenomenological. These methods, however, are conducted within a natural scientific framework and they incorporate values of measurement and quantification. Even Wundt's introspection uses the natural scientific paradigm to account for experience--it is essentially an extraspective account of inner experience (see Rychlak, 1968, 1977). The writer would like to make it

clear that in this work phenomenology refers to the discipline which has developed from the likes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and it alludes to both a paradigm and a method which is quite different from natural science.

What follows is a brief description of some basic concepts of phenomenological psychology. In North America, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh and Seattle University have carried on the tradition of phenomenology and many contemporary phenomenologists have been associated with these institutions. For a detailed account of the assumptions and methods of phenomenology, the reader is referred to Colaizzi (1978), Giorgi (1975), Romanyshyn (1978, 1982), Stevick (1971), Valle and King (1978), Van den Berg (1972), Van Kaam (1966) and Van Manen (1984).

A. Primacy of Experience

Being of idealistic slant, phenomenologists hold that experience is all we can ever know for sure. "Things in themselves" (noumena) can never be known directly, because the mind knows only their sensory representations (phenomena) (Rychlack, 1968, 1977). All knowledge of the world ultimately comes to us through these sensory representations, regardless of how sophisticated our technology. Experience is therefore the primary datum (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Phenomenologists are interested in the nature of naive experience--that is, before experience is overlaid with our theories and pre-conceptions of the world. At this level of naive, "primordial" experience there is continuity for all humanity. For example, if fear can be accurately described at its primordial level, that description could be expected to illuminate the fundamental nature of fear for all of humanity. One of the purposes of phenomenology is to describe human experience at this most basic level.

B. Bracketing

If at all possible, there is an attempt to apprehend primordial experience in its immediacy, without the interference of prior expectations or explanations. Contrary to the natural scientific attitude, the immediate ways of knowing (e.g., physiognomic knowing) are considered to be more reliable than information which is mediated through pre-determined ideologies or sophisticated instruments. There is an effort to explicate personal biases and set them aside. This setting aside of expectations and assumptions is called "bracketing." The researchers attempt to bracket both the conventional definitions of the phenomena in question (e.g., anger is a result of frustration) and their own personal explanations. Although it is not possible to completely set aside these assumptions, researchers attempt to articulate their prejudices in order to clarify the biases in their observations. In natural science research, the researcher attempts to remain as objective as possible towards the topic in question. Any personal response is a possible contamination of the data, and there is an effort to conceal any personal relationship to the work.

C. All Knowledge is Human Knowledge

Within an existential framework, all knowledge is human knowledge, because it is derived from human perception. Because the experiencing person and the object "out there" can be understood only in the context of each other, there is no distinction between "knowledge of things" as separate from "understanding," i.e., perceiving the meaning of things to the person. Any attempt to distance the observer from the observed is an abstraction from the real state of affairs, because there can be no object of knowledge without a knower, no observer without something to

observe. We are unavoidably intimate with our world. Because it is impossible to sever observer from the object observed, all knowledge of material substance is inextricably bound up with the meaning of that thing as it is related to the observer.

D. Co-Constitutionality

One of the basic tenets of phenomenology is that the self and the world exist in dialogal relationship with each other (Colaizzi, 1978; Keen, 1975). Because they are inextricably linked, they reflect each other and co-constitute one another. For example, Van den Berg (1972) has described how, when a person is depressed, buildings will tilt and loom ominously, dwarfing the person. Phenomenologically speaking, depression is buildings drained of color which threaten and glower at one. The person and the environment reflect each other because a change in experience is a change in the face of the world. This wholeness of the life-world implies that the boundaries of "inside me" and "outside me" are not relevant when describing certain experiences (see also Romanyshyn, 1978). It is interesting to note that in eidetic imagery research, the distinction between images seen "inside one's head" and "outside" as an object, was not useful in describing eidetic phenomena. It seems that the self-world, the imager and the images have to be understood as a whole.

E. Features of Psychological Life - Metaphor and Reflection

The material world and psychological life reflect each other, as in the example given where buildings assume an ominous facade during bouts of depression. It is not necessary to say that either depression creates an illusion of larger buildings, or that tall buildings induce feelings of insignificance and dysphoria. Suffice it to say that the

material world and psychological life reflect each other. The relations are not direct and causal but rather indirect and metaphorical. In phenomenology, psychological life is considered to be an activity which deepens the material world through its reflection of that world (Romanyshyn, 1982). "The mode of psychological understanding is imaginal rather than rational" (Romanyshyn, 1982, p. 7) and as such, it proceeds by way of hints, allusions, metaphor and story (see also Warnock, 1976). Neither "material reality" nor "psychological life" are the whole story, but one facet deepens the understanding through another facet (Romanyshyn, 1982).

F. Meaning

In phenomenology, the significance of events is included as part of the research. This is a natural development from the premise that all knowledge is human knowledge. Romanyshyn gives a lucid account of how actions are also events. That is, they have significance in the context of human life (Romanyshyn, 1982). For example, William Harvey's discovery of the circulatory system was not merely a scientific achievement. The significance of his discovery, the meaning of the discovery that the heart works like a pump, is that "Harvey's heart is democratic, it makes animals and people the same" (Romanyshyn, 1982, p. 121).

Phenomenological research attempts to elucidate the meaning of common experiences, such as anger, love, forgiveness or "being understood." This is done by asking people directly what these experiences are like and what they mean. These "subjects" are called "co-researchers," because they are considered an equal participant in the research process. For example, Stevick (1971) interviewed a number

of persons regarding their experience of anger. After obtaining a number of descriptions, she was able to synthesize common elements, such as "a wanting-to-burst-forth body" and "the other, in anger, is transformed into . . . the other who stands in the way" (Stevick, 1971, p. 144). She was able to do this by keeping an ear open not just for what was said, but for the underlying meaning of the phrases. She went beyond the analysis of the content per se in order to articulate the implicit message. This is a hermeneutic process and goes beyond an analysis of the lexical content of the text. The intention of a co-researcher's text

is something other than the sum of the individual meanings of the individual sentences. A text is more than a linear succession of sentences. It is a cumulative, holistic, process. (Ricoeur, 1979, p. 90)

Taylor (1979) has contributed to the discussion of meaning in the human sciences by outlining three of its dimensions. He describes subjective meaning as the "coherence between the actions of the agent and the meaning of the situation for him" (Taylor, 1979, p. 35). It has meaning for the individual only. For other levels of meaning, a consensus is possible. Intersubjective meaning is rooted in social practice and gives people a common language and a common understanding of norms (Taylor, 1979). People can share this meaning and participate in it. Finally, common meaning is part of the common reference world, not only shared between a select group of people, but "communally sustained, whereas sharing is something we do each on his own" (Taylor, 1979, p. 51).

G. Objectivity is Fidelity to the Phenomena

The writer has taken pains to discriminate the realism-idealism

dimension from the objective-subjective dimension. Let it be said again that objectivity is not to be identified with realism or positivism, but it refers to a common consensus about the meaning of things.

Subjectivity does not mean psychological or personal. It refers to an idea or a meaning that is unique and idiosyncratic. For levels of meaning where consensus is possible, objectivity is also possible.

Colaizzi has described objectivity as "fidelity to the phenomena" (1978, p. 52), a poetic phrase which captures the personal commitment and attentive listening so valued in phenomenological research. This objectivity is an allegiance to psychological experience and it means that the researcher's statements "faithfully express what stands before him, whatever may be the phenomena" (1978, p. 52). For example, a typist's fingers fly deftly and knowingly to the proper keys. A conventional explanation is that the brain signals the voluntary muscles of the hand to perform. However, in the experience of typing the typist is not attending to the hands or fingers, but on the text to be written. Phenomenologically speaking, it is not the brain that knows where the keys are but rather the knowledge is in the hands (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). The latter statement faithfully reflects the experience as given and is psychologically accurate and objective. Any typist can confirm that it is the hands that know where the keys are, and this metaphor reflects the naive experience. In phenomenology, objectivity means staying true to psychological life in its metaphorical and paradoxical nature.

The basic concepts of phenomenology have evolved out of a serious attempt to describe the nature of consciousness. The concepts do not identify strictly separate domains but blend into each other and illuminate each other. The methods for translating these concepts into

practice are varied and the present thesis is just one example of such a method.

V. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD AND THE EIDETIC PARENTS TEST

As Haber has pointed out after 20 years of researching eidetic imagery:

Experimental studies tell us nothing about the phenomenology of visual imagery and even less about individual differences in such subject states.... The ghost of eidetic imagery is the fear of phenomenology. (Haber, 1979, p. 594)

The present study takes up the challenge of attempting to study eidetic imagery from a phenomenological perspective. Ahsen's work with the Eidetic Parents Test will be taken as a starting point, because he aims at uncovering the eidetic images of parents, and his series of imagery exercises provide a way of inquiring about the actual experience of imagery. The present study attempts to compare his conclusions with the results of a phenomenological analysis. The overall purpose is to describe the structural patterns of experience manifested in the Eidetic Parents Test experience.

There are two major questions overriding this study and it is important to distinguish them. The first question is: What are the structural elements revealed through phenomenological examination of people's experiences of Eidetic Parents Test? Secondly, a larger question: What pattern of structural elements does one want to identify as eidetic imagery? The second question cannot be answered definitively in this study because the answer requires a consensus from other researchers in eidetic imagery. However, this project is an initial stage in the taxonomy of imagery experiences and if it successfully identifies a pattern of eidetic imagery elements, it will have contributed to a general understanding of the phenomena.

The method in the present study emerged from the basic concepts

described in the previous section. There is no absolute and unalterable research design in phenomenology because it is expected that different phenomena will require different methods of research. The following method was adopted from examples and suggestions given by Colaizzi (1978), Romanyshyn (1982) and Stevick (1971). The method is outlined as follows: (a) Bracketing, (b) Pilot Study, (c) Co-Researchers and Interviews, (d) Thematic Analysis, and (e) Validation.

A. Bracketing

Part of the phenomenological method is to articulate the researcher's investment in her work in order to clarify biases in the observations. This process is called bracketing. One method of bracketing is to engage in self-reflection and articulate the personal expectations one has about the phenomena in question. In order to examine pre-judgments I might have about imagery, I undertook a process of self-questioning before beginning the formal research. This procedure is outlined as follows:

(1) What is my personal experience of images?

- Often see images - configurations of people, objects, shapes, colors of varying degrees of vividness, "in the mind's eye" but with various locations in space, sometimes with accompanying sounds, sometimes affecting a sense of the air I breathe or atmosphere I see.
- The images have the quality of "coming to me" spontaneously rather than being deliberately constructed.
- Some seem to transcend time and space, i.e., refer to the future or to other people's life situation.
- They will often evolve and transform before my eyes - often have

the qualities of movement and luminosity. _____

- Sometimes they occur with the experience of strong feelings or excitement over new ideas, sometimes not.
- They affect my body in a number of ways - overpowering images make me feel drugged, sickened, dizzy - other ones give me a feeling of lightness, energy.
- They seem easier to "see" when I withdraw attention from the environment.

6 - (2) What has influenced my choice of the topic eidetic imagery?

- Personal experience of imagery.
- An incident: during a counselling session I casually mentioned some images in conversation and the therapist asked me to use them in a simple exercise. In doing the exercise I became aware for the first time that the images had a direct relationship to my thoughts and feelings. I had previously dismissed them as illogical and childish. Since that time, images and dreams have been important to me.

(3) What are my expectations/assumptions about imagery?

- That it is a natural faculty available to most, if not all, people.
- When attention is removed from the outside world, images become more accessible.
- Imagery is meaningfully related to personal experience.
- Images sometimes use the language of symbolism, and other times are concrete and literal.
- They have a certain kind of autonomy although they can be influenced to some degree.

- Imagery may be connected to the physiology of the brain or the eye, but physiology cannot account for their element of meaning.
- Imagery is pre-verbal.
- I expect that images can be used to become more aware of feelings
- Also assume that they point to new possibilities and therefore contain the seeds of healing and change.
- I also expect that some people do not easily relate to the imagistic mode of experience.

(4) What are some of my fears about investigating imagery?

- That no one else will report any experience of images and that this lack of confirmation will force me to abandon my own beliefs about the importance of the imagination.
- Perhaps there will be a consensus of reporting images, but no one will think they are valuable.

(5) Possible variations of imagery:

- Some people may have a symbolic mode which is not visual imagery but consists of sound, sensations of pressure, etc.
- Different kinds of imagery may be confused (e.g., memories, eidetics, daydreams).
- Some people may experience the meaning of images in different ways. For example, highly saturated colors might indicate little emotional involvement for some people instead of strong emotions, as it does for me.

The afore-mentioned questions and answers are examples of the initial stages of identifying my personal investment in the topic of imagery and bracketing presuppositions. Some implications of these observations can be noted:

- (1) It appears that in studying imagery I am seeking confirmation of my own experience.

Implication: I will be less open to reports which contradict or challenge my own notions of imagery. I may subtly alter descriptions in order to align them to my own experience. If people express their experience of imagery in a manner that is foreign to me, I may be unable to recognize that it is in fact an accurate report.

- (2) People who do not experience imagery pose a threat to me because they disconfirm me.

Implication: Subjects who are not cooperative may arouse feelings of fear, hostility or panic in me. I may try to force them to conform to my expectations. People may have other ways of experiencing the world in symbolic fashion but I would be less likely to appreciate the validity of those experiences. It may be that imagery is irrelevant for some people.

- (3) I have an enormous personal investment in the world of imagination and assume that it is divorced in some measure from concrete reality. *

Implication: By unduly emphasizing the importance of the imaginal I could make fanciful mountains out of humble molehills. As well, the division of the world into these two realms may be unduly arbitrary.

- (4) I am seeking to identify a purpose of imagery, i.e., I believe imagery contains possibilities for healing and want to find practical applications for it. Again, this structure is imposed on the phenomena.

Implication: This goal-orientation may lead to less tolerance of ambiguity or of contradictory reports which do not contribute to my final aim. Perhaps imagery is an immensely destructive experience for some people.

The process of identifying assumptions and bracketing them is not simply a chapter disposed of before collecting data, but one that should be mentally re-examined as the research continues. It is not merely an intellectual process because many assumptions do not become apparent until feelings are aroused as the researcher becomes involved in the work (see Becker, 1986). The most valuable attribute of the process of bracketing is that it reveals potential blind spots - which in the present case are certainly noteworthy! It also reveals the personal investment and motivation that impel the entire study.

B. Pilot Study

Before actually interviewing the co-researchers, the writer first did the Eidetic Parents Test herself and reviewed the responses. Next, a preliminary interview was done with one other person. As a result of this interview, it was decided to use only material from the first few steps of the Eidetic Parents Test. The entire test of 30 situations was too lengthy to permit a thorough examination of each image experience. After gaining familiarity with the material via self-study and preliminary session, the eight co-researchers of the present study were interviewed.

C. Co-researchers and Interviews

Becker (1986) has described interviewing in human science research. Her poll of many noted researchers revealed that the number of people interviewed usually fell between one and ten (although some projects

used as many as 50 people). "The main criterion is whether the researcher judges that the goals of the research can be accomplished" using a given number of co-researchers (Becker, 1986, p. 107). The writer judged that a total of eight men and women would give a sense of the possible variations of imagery, and yet was a small enough number for in-depth analysis. The writer deliberately did not seek out people who were gifted in imagery (such as artists) because the focus was on possibilities that imagery presented for "everyman." The co-researchers were either friends or were referred by students at the university who knew of the project. Some acquaintance with the co-researchers was considered helpful because their relationship to their parents was a potentially sensitive topic. All of the co-researchers were between the ages of 20 and 35.

William¹ was an undergraduate psychology student, whose interests included philosophy. Hilary worked as a researcher and also had a background in psychology. Miriam was well known to me, having been a friend for years. She was working on her doctorate in psychology and also loved to be involved in sports. Mark was a friend whose interests centered on politics and the third world. Jill was a fellow student who always balanced studies with lots of time in the outdoors. Rachel was a former teacher, married and expecting a baby. Gary was a fellow student and had artistic interests. Candice was fresh out of high school, attending her first year of college and was passionately interested in show dogs. I had met all of the co-researchers previous to the interview session, if only briefly, and Miriam was the only one I knew

¹Note: all names given are pseudonyms.

extremely well at the time of the interview. Both Miriam and Jill were familiar with the concepts and purposes of phenomenology. Because the aim of the study was to obtain descriptions of imagery experiences, and not to make statistical generalizations, there was no attempt made to obtain a statistically random sample. The criteria for choosing participants were their ability to articulate and describe imagery experience.

The interviews were structured around the first few "frames" of the EPT, although other topics which arose from the imagery exercise were usually discussed as well. The first frame is a relatively neutral exercise and prepares the co-researcher to begin imaging. The instructions are as follows:

Picture your parents in the house where you lived most of the time with them, the house which gives you the feeling of home.
- Where do you see them? - What are they doing? - How do you feel when you see the images? - Are there any memories connected with this picture? (Ahsen, 1977, p. 54)

The second exercise is of major interest, because it focusses on the parental images alone. The instructions for it are as follows:

Now, set aside this picture of the house and see your parents standing directly in front of you. - Tell me, as you look at them, who is standing on your right? - Now, try to switch their positions. - Do you experience any discomfort when you do this? Try to switch their positions again. - Do you feel any difficulty? Do you feel that these images are independent of your control? (Ahsen, 1977, p. 55)

As mentioned previously, the interviews were structured around these two exercises and also encompassed feelings, reactions, and memories associated to the images. The interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed.

D. Thematic Analysis

A thematic analysis attempts to abstract the underlying themes

implicit in the co-researchers' statements. It attempts to articulate the meaning and the structure of the phenomenon in question. The thematic analysis conducted was adapted from Colaizzi (1978). Each protocol was read several times in order to develop an overall sense of its content and meaning, and the thematic analysis itself encompassed several stages, as shown in Table I.

Table I


Thematic Analysis

1. Within Protocol Analysis
 - a) description of basic narrative elements
 - b) first order themes
 - c) second order themes (major theme clusters of individual protocols)
2. Between Protocol Analysis
 - a) third order themes (summary theme clusters across all protocols)
 - b) fourth order themes (structural elements of Eidetic Parents Test imagery experience)

In Figure 1, a flow chart illustrates the thematic analysis.

Within Protocol Analysis. A complete protocol analysis for one co-researcher is given in Appendix A. The reader is referred to Appendix A for a detailed example of how the thematic analysis was done. In the protocol, each response is identified by number and a line by line examination is carried out. First, a point-form description of the basic narrative elements was made. For example, in this interview, William saw his mother making macaroni while his father was in the

Figure 1 - Flow Chart of Thematic Analysis



bathroom shaving. The basic elements are: mother cooking, in kitchen, open (room), nurture (nurturing activity); Father shaving (?), bathroom, prepare for work, closed (room), isolated (activity, apart from others). In the next column, the formulated meanings of themes are suggested: parental activity and location reveals the person, e.g., mother is available, open, nurturing; father is unavailable, closed; also, parental qualities are differentiated. At this stage, interpretations are suggested for the co-researcher's statements. These themes were either noted immediately after summarizing the narrative elements or they emerged after reading the entire protocol. An effort was made not to "force" an interpretation if none was apparent.

After reviewing the protocols several times in this manner (line by line analysis), the underlying themes were grouped into clusters perceived by the researcher. When different themes bore a resemblance of either content or process, they were judged as forming a cluster. For example, in the protocol in Appendix A, several different lines suggest the theme that "The image is multi-faceted; one thing and another and another." (Note: Line references are given in Appendix B.) This is a major theme cluster for the protocol. The major themes for William's protocol in Appendix A are given in Appendix B. The major themes for the seven other researchers are given in Appendices C to I.

The theme clusters were not determined by the number of relevant lines alone. This would have been an arithmetic evaluation of the text rather than a reflective one. For example, if one line in a protocol seemed to capture an essential quality of the imagery experience, it would be chosen as a major theme, even if there were no other lines echoing that theme. Van Manen described this process as highlighting,

whereby

we listen to or read a text several times and ask 'What statements or phrases seem particularly essential or revealing about the experience being described?' (Van Manen, 1984, p. 21)

Thus, a judgment is made about the significance of the statement within the context of the imagery experience.

Between Protocol Analysis. After the major themes for all the protocols were established and reviewed, they were further grouped into summary theme clusters. These summary themes encompassed the major themes of the individual protocols and an exhaustive description of these more fundamental themes was made. This "meta-level" analysis emphasized the process of imagery more than specific content.

Themes which were repeated across protocols were summarized and those which appeared to be related were "clustered." The summary themes were listed and an exhaustive description of their attributes was made.

After the summary themes were listed and described, a further abstraction was made, in order to clarify the structural elements. Again, the summary themes were examined for repeated statements and for clusters of related statements. Finally, an identification of essential elements was made.

E. Validation

Unfortunately, only four co-researchers were available for the validation part of the thematic analysis. Each of the four were sent a transcript of their interview and a copy of the major themes derived for their individual protocol. They were asked to comment on omissions or inappropriate themes, and these suggestions were incorporated into the analysis. This process is called "spiraling" because the researcher arrives at preliminary findings, consults with co-researchers and

"spirals" back to the themes with any new suggestions (Giorgi, 1975).

The co-researchers thus consulted validated the major themes and did not note any omissions or inappropriate interpretations. The participants reviewed their protocols, and the derived themes "fit" their sense of what happened during the Eidetic Parents Test exercise.

VI. RESULTS: KNOTS IN THE WEB OF EXPERIENCE

So phenomenological themes are more like knots in the web of our experiences, around which certain lived experiences are spun and thus experienced as meaningful wholes.

(Van Manen, 1984, p. 20)

A thematic analysis points to "knots in the web of experience" and it indicates the essential themes of an experience but does not define them once and for all. "A thematic phrase only serves to point at, to allude to, or to hint at an aspect of the phenomenon" (Van Manen, 1984, p. 21). It is as if experience were a crystalline structure, with thousands of facets reflecting lights of many different colors. The phenomenological description cannot describe each facet, each color, but it can suggest the invisible axial structure around which the molecules gather to give the crystal its shape. There are no absolute statements to be made because there is always the possibility that another description will reveal complementary or even hidden facets of the "crystal" (Van Manen, 1984). As Van Manen has wittily suggested, "when you listen to a presentation of a phenomenological nature, you will listen in vain for the punchline" (Van Manen, 1984, p. 2).

Given that the results of a thematic analysis will be inexact, allusive and enigmatic, what is their value? As mentioned earlier, the aim of phenomenology is to describe human experience. By its very nature, experience is subtle and complex. The intricacies of human emotions, physiology and thought that comprise even a single moment of experience are difficult to describe. A phenomenological analysis attempts to articulate, in however clumsy a fashion, a pattern in the midst of this complexity. The researcher attempts to return "unto the things themselves," as Husserl suggests (in Colaizzi, 1978, p. 56). This means that there is an attempt to discern the nature of experience

in its most naive form, without sophisticated instruments and technology. It is almost impossible to do this in a way that is exact and definitive, because the context of experience is so complex. The results of a phenomenological analysis emerge from reflections on the data made retrospectively. "Human science is largely *ex post* understanding," because "The very terms in which the future will have to be characterized if we are to understand it properly are not available to us at present" (Taylor, 1979, pp. 69-70). Also, as Salner points out, the social context of knowledge forces one to acknowledge an "epistemological pluralism" and therefore "all epistemologies and the methodologies that flow from them are human and thus partial" (Salner, 1986, p. 118).

Following is a description of the results of the thematic analysis. The first two stages of the analysis--description of narrative elements and first order themes--were too lengthy to be presented in their entirety. William's protocol in Appendix A is given as an example of the first stages of analysis. The same procedure was used for each protocol. As noted previously, different interpretations of a potocol are possible, and the question to keep in mind when reviewing William's protocol is, "Does the data support the interpretation (theme) suggested?"

An examination of William's protocol and the subsequent analysis will give the reader a good idea of the process. For example, in Appendix A, response number 29 includes, "Right now she's standing there and she's happy. But my feeling isn't one of total happiness with her. . . . all she does is stand there with a smile. I want her to move around a bit." The first order theme is "paradox: dissatisfaction with

the image as given." The image is a part of William's imagination, but he is unable to command the image to be exactly as he wants. In Appendix B, the second order theme for this response is given in theme number 6: "The image has a commanding presence and activity of its own. This integrity of the image is revealed in the co-researcher's dissatisfaction with the image as given." The line references for all of the second order themes of William's protocol identify which of the original responses contributed to that theme (see Appendix B). The results of the second order theme analysis are given for all of the co-researchers and are listed in Appendix B to I.

The second order themes seemed to fall into two groups, which for descriptive purposes will be called the "Dynamic" group and the "Static" group. In the first group, the imagery seemed to have a dynamic and changeable nature, while in the second group the images were less lively and had less impact. This differentiation of two groups was a preliminary step in the between-protocol analysis. The thematic clusters of the Dynamic group seemed to describe a different response to the Eidetic Parents Test than that of the Static group. The implication is that the Eidetic Parents Test does not elicit the same kind of response for all persons. William's responses fell into the Dynamic grouping of themes.

For a schematic view of the analysis, the reader is referred again to Figure 1.

The third order theme clusters illustrate the fundamental themes of first, the Dynamic group (six protocols) and second, the Static group (two protocols). William's original response contributed to the third order theme listed in Table II (Dynamic Protocols), number 6: "There is

Table II

Third Order Theme Clusters - Dynamic Protocols

1. Dynamism - spontaneity - autonomy.
2. Mutual emotional responsiveness between image and co-researcher.
3. Kinesthetic responsiveness to image.
4. Image has multi-levels of meaning.
5. There is an inherent structure of the image which resists direct manipulation.
6. Image responds to verbal suggestions.
7. Image reveals differentiation of parental qualities.
8. Image reveals perceptions of parents not previously recognized.
9. Sensory details of an image are vivid containers of experience.
(In the image of home dwells childhood.)
10. The image has its own time.
11. The language of the image is poetic.
12. There is discrimination among different kinds of imagery experiences.

an inherent structure of the image which resists direct manipulation." The third order theme clusters for the Static group are listed in Table III.

Following is a detailed presentation of the "third order themes" which illustrate the fundamental themes of first, the Dynamic protocols, and second, the Static protocols. Each summary theme encompasses varied but related theme statements. The writer attempted to elucidate the underlying meaning of second order themes and identify a pattern for each group of protocols. In the discussion that follows, only a few examples of each theme are given because space does not permit an exhaustive list of each representative response. There were sometimes dozens of such responses. Not all co-researchers explicitly exhibited all themes for their group; but all of them implicitly participated in each one. For example, the theme "language of the image is poetic" was very obvious in Mark's protocol in which fantastical images and indescribable substances stymied his search for words. Once identified, this theme was evident in subtler forms--in the ambiguous, changeable nature of the father's image in William's protocol, in the layers of meaning embodied in the parental stance for most of the protocols. Such themes tended to illuminate implicit aspects of less articulate protocols, and overall the protocols tended to illuminate each other. For example, the rigid character of the Static protocols threw into relief the spontaneity of the images in the Dynamic protocols. The themes do not set absolute boundaries, but rather allude to "knots in the web" of the imagery experience, which are all interconnected.

Following is a discussion of the results of the third order theme clusters for the Dynamic and Static group of protocols.

Table III

Third Order Themes - Static Protocols

1. The image has a static, photographic quality.
2. The co-researcher is not personally involved in the image, but is neutral and distant.
3. There is little kinesthetic involvement in the image.
4. The image has literal meaning only.
5. Parental qualities are not well differentiated.
6. The co-researcher actively constructs the image.
7. Caution, doubt and uncertainty characterize the relationship between co-researcher and researcher, and also characterize the attitude towards the Eidetic Parents Test.
8. The image cannot be clearly discriminated from other imagery experiences.

A. Third Order Themes - Dynamic Protocols

1. Dynamism - spontaneity - autonomy. The most striking aspect of the images in the first group of protocols was the dynamic nature of the image. The images changed spontaneously and the mutual impact of image and co-researcher comprised a lively interaction. The spontaneous nature of the transformations often surprised and delighted the co-researchers. In the example below, the transformation of the parental image is accompanied by a release of emotion and sense of resolution, even though the meaning of the new form is not immediately apparent.

Miriam - "Well, I miss my parents. That is revived through looking at images of them, or through this whole exercise . . . right now I have two green flashes; one going like this (motions with right hand, a curved sweep in the air) and one going like this (same motion in opposite direction)."

- "They (the flashes) were like paisleys that were changing form and swirling around clockwise. After that they were just meshing. I don't know if they were the two parent images doing that."
- ". . . The only feeling I can think of (in relation to the paisley forms) is almost like a letting go. Letting go of the images visually and emotionally."

The parental images suddenly change and two swirling green paisleys appear. It is like a sudden scene change in a dream. The co-researcher is uncertain if the paisley forms are transformations of the image, but she does say that the emotional content of both image scenes are related: the paisleys appear as she visually and emotionally lets go of the parental images. The paisleys also have a calming effect and she is no longer disturbed by sadness at missing her parents.

Eidetic imagery has been associated with photographic memory, although Haber himself (1979) declares that this is not an accurate account of the phenomenon. In the spontaneous transformations that

occur during the Eidetic Parents Test, it appears that the images do not resemble photographic reproductions. They have a variable nature which is entirely unlike the static quality of a photograph.

Hilary summed up the spontaneous nature of the images as she remarked "When they called up they sort of came like that without trying to place them." The images were "called up," they were not deliberately invented. They came "without trying" and therefore the co-researcher did not experience a sense of effortful construction. Hilary's statement described a feeling experienced by all other co-researchers in the Dynamic group.

The dynamism of the image was likely to be revealed when the co-researchers attended to extremes, for example, when they concentrated on very negative qualities of the image.

Mark - "The most negative aspect of it is my father . . . that side of the image is lifeless and brown. But it's moving as well. It's not totally negative. The image is changing now and it's . . . my father's in sort of a large . . . this is really strange . . . they're both encased in a sort of plastic kind of . . . cover."

Remember also that in Miriam's example, the paisley forms appeared as she described how she missed her parents. Attention to a negative and painful part of the image seems to "activate" both the image and the co-researcher to present a different facet of the image, and a transformation subsequently occurs.

In reviewing the Dynamic protocols, it appears that the image transforms in response to: 1) specific words or suggestions; 2) shifts in emotion; 3) shifts in attention; and, 4) changes over time in response to ongoing interactions with parents.

As a result of the spontaneity and dynamic character of the image,

it has the quality of autonomy. The co-researcher does not decide when or how the image will change and is surprised by the new configurations (as in Miriam's and Mark's examples). The image has the quality of "Being-in-itself," and this lends the image a sense of presence, almost as if it were a real personage.

2. Mutual emotional/responsiveness between image and co-researcher. The image and the co-researcher are involved with each other and respond emotionally to each other. As seen in examples of the previous theme, Miriam's emotions of sadness precede the image transformation into paisleys, which are accompanied by new feelings of "letting go." It is as if the image and images are dancing together, with one movement following another.

Hilary describes how she felt emotionally attuned to the image:

Hilary - "Just the way an image holds so much of a feeling in it, you almost can't separate the two. I found it really difficult to separate what I was seeing from what I know was happening (in the image) . . . perhaps not happening physically but going on inside of them."

The visual image elicits an emotional response and has an impact on the co-researcher which demands personal involvement.

The images also reflect the co-researcher's feelings and seem to express the co-researcher's emotional perception of the relationship's energy and closeness.

Miriam - "I feel that my interactions with my parents would probably constantly revitalize the image. It's almost like charging them up with energy. . . . It was like the one of my dad . . . didn't feel as recharged because I don't feel as connected to him."

Miriam has a sense that her actual relationship with her parents has an impact on the image, and that as her relationship to them wanes or intensifies, the image would reflect this accordingly. As the co-

researcher articulates the image, the emotions are recognized more clearly. The images reflect these emotional realizations and may undergo a transformation as a result.

3. Kinesthetic responsiveness to image. Another striking feature of the Dynamic protocols is that the visual image is often accompanied by somatic sensations, some of which are highly localized. In William's protocol, he reports sensations in his left arm and shoulder as he looks at his father's image (see Appendix A). He interprets these visceral sensations as feelings of emptiness, as if his arm longed to hug someone. It is as if the images bodily inhabit the co-researchers, as if they are "seen" outside the co-researchers and at the same time dwell within them.

Miriam - (Co-researcher was asked to reverse positions of parents in the image). "Hmm . . . God! (laughter) I'm going cross-eyed! . . . I want to switch my right eye and left eye, because I can't switch them (parents)."

"... my right visual field feels stronger than my left visual field, and that's the one where my father is. Not that his image is stronger but just that it was almost easier for me to see with my right eye."

In the above example, each eye "belongs" to one parent, or each parent "belongs" to a different eye. The physiological link to the image is so strong that Miriam feels she would have to exchange eyeballs in order for the parents to change right-left positions. After some effort, she was able to reverse the images. Miriam also feels that her somatic response to the image is significant: her right visual field, associated with father, is stronger. Later in the interview she ponders what this could mean in terms of their relationship.

It becomes obvious that the visual aspect of the image does not contain the whole of the image experience. Hilary was asked which

parent seemed to be more active and she clearly stated that visually, there was no difference between the energy level of the two parents.

However, she identified her mother as the more active one:

It's just what I feel when I see my mother. Just sort of motion . . . It's almost as though I'm in some way inside her, feeling antsy or hyper myself.

The visceral response to the image betrays an impact of the image that is not otherwise obvious.

4. Image has multi-levels of meaning. The image has meaning on many levels, ranging from the literal and immediate to insights of profound significance. In the example below, Jill describes the process of meaning unfolding in the parental images.

Jill - "The colors I attach to him (father) are kind of a mustard color, and with mom would be a . . . I see her in blue."

"I see blue as being a kind of healing color . . . and connected to health, healing, that sort of thing. And yellow . . . what I see around Dad, is a . . . there's a very big difference between my mom and my father in terms of their general health."

"... His general health is pretty hazy, for lack of a better word."

"Well, initially, they (the colors) started off with specific clothing that I see my parents in. But it seemed to go even beyond that. It seemed sort of an energy field that was depicted by this color that I saw on each of them."

The colors are initially attributes of the parents' clothing but come to be understood as symbolic of deeper aspects of the image--such as healing power and general energy level. The meaning of the image is consistent at many levels and the different levels illuminate each other.

It also appears that the formal properties of the image--such as big-little, left-right, light-dark--are meaningful. As Miriam noted, "There seems to be a connection between why one parent was in one

location and one in the other." Some qualities of the parent seem inherent in their left-right position.

In the following example, the image reveals the co-researcher's response to fundamental elements of experience, such as "vagueness" and "darkness."

William - "... but my father has the feeling of being aggressive. He isn't doing anything - motion . . ."

(later) Researcher: "What in the image gives you that impression (i.e., of aggression)? Or, how do you know that - how do you come to that?"

"The darkness does that, a little bit. For some reason, I can't completely put his face together. . . ."

For William, the formal properties of vagueness and darkness suggest aggressiveness: the image refuses to "come together" for him--it opposes his will. In the previous example of Jill's, the fundamental property "blueness" means healing and health.

The meaning of the image can also be apprehended from a visceral response to it, as when William notes that his stomach jumps at seeing the father image, or when Hilary knows her mother is the more active one, by the way Hilary feels "antsy" when looking at the image. The posture and stance of the parents also betray a message, as when Rachel describes

... a proudness (in the way they are standing). They're both very proud people ... (as if they're saying) 'we are who we are and quite aloof from the rest of everyone else, besides each other.'

The physical stance embodies parents' attitudes, emotions, and the nature of their relationship to each other and the world.

Meaning is also gained by reflecting on the image in the context of the co-researcher's life: "I think that's why Dad has such a green image to him, because he had so little to do with my upbringing years"

(Rachel).

The different meanings of the image tend to be inclusive, rather than exclusive. The image's multi-faceted character shows that it is one thing and another and another. For example, Mark noted that his father was imbued with a dull brown and he had a military stance which varied from "at ease" to a stiff salute. Later, the image began floating in a capsule of indescribable material. The father image is sometimes smiling and sometimes angry. It varies from at ease to saluting or adjusting glasses. It is both rigidly contained in space and freely floating in it. To deny any of these paradoxical facets of the image is to impoverish it. The image reveals many different aspects of the same personage, and the meanings are inclusive rather than exclusive.

Finally, the meaning of the image unfolds bit by bit. It is continuously evolving. Jill's understanding of the meaning of "blue" and "yellow" in her image evolved from a literal interpretation (clothes) to one more deeply significant (health, energy field). Hilary notes how her father's calm public persona is probably the result of his career training. Miriam watches as her parental image is succeeded by swirling green paisleys, and describes how she feels more peaceful after "letting go" of her parents. The meanings of the image are continuously developing and it is an encumbrance to declare "this is the meaning of the image, once and for all."

5. There is an inherent structure of the image which resists direct manipulation. The image seems to have certain qualities which are inherent and cannot be changed. The inherent structure of the image is revealed most often during attempts to change or distort the original

image, such as changing the parental right-left position. In the following examples, the co-researcher responded after being asked to reverse the positions of parents standing together:

William - "It's difficult. I can see a picture of them in the other positions, but it's difficult. It feels far more natural the other way."

Mark - "Well, it doesn't work. You can't . . . just the idea of them standing together . . . it's funny, the white tends to stay on the right with my mother."

" . . . it's very confusing trying to switch their positions."

Rachel - "It seems unnatural for some reason. Not that it should, but it seems . . . the colors stay pretty well the same--their (parents) reaction to everyone else--they can adapt to that. . . . But somehow it seems more natural the other way."

Miriam - "I want to switch my right eye and my left eye because I can't switch them (parents)."

"It just confuses things, I can't get a secure image of them."

The integrity of the image is shown when it resists the influence of the co-researcher. This lends the images a sense of presence, as if they were actual persons.

Although the essential elements of the image are difficult to alter, the co-researcher can change superficial aspects with ease:

Jill - "I don't think I could change it, no (the parental image). I mean I could dress them in different colors (laughter) but the energy that I feel is basically the same."

There is commonly a sense of struggle with the image when the co-researcher is dissatisfied with the image as given, and when he or she unsuccessfully tries to change it.

William - "Right now, I'm not happy with her (image of mother). Right now I guess it's all she does is stand there with a smile. I want her to move around a bit."

Researcher: "What would you like her to do?"

"A strange thought came to my head - dance!"

This struggle with the image presents the co-researchers with a paradox: how can the image be a product of their own imaginations and yet resist their efforts?

Miriam - "I'm creating them (images) but there's a sense of their being separate, too. Or at least rigidly there."

When there is a struggle between what the image will do and what the imager wants it to do, the imager is confronted with the realization that the imagination has a "reality" hitherto unrecognized.

The inherent structure is also revealed when the instructions for the Eidetic Parents Test are incongruous with the co-researcher's experience. Rachel remarked that she often saw images of her parents. Her "natural" images differed from those of the Eidetic Parents Test:

Rachel - "They wouldn't be together. One would be in one area and the other would be on the other side of the screen so to speak."

"It's kind of amusing to think of the two of them together . . . because it's an unnatural sort of thing."

For Rachel, the instruction to "see your parents standing together" violated her natural image of them, which was to see them in a separated state (as they had been most of her life). When she saw them standing together, she felt some incongruity and uncertainty with respect to the requested image. Paradoxically, the inability to freely comply with the request, in Rachel's case, suggests that the parental image has an inherent structure whose essential elements actually precede the Eidetic Parents Test itself.

6. Image responds to verbal suggestions. As mentioned earlier, there are aspects of the image that can be changed at will. Specific words influence the particular image that arises, and a common example is that the word "house" elicits different images than the word "home."

The image can be altered by the researcher's or co-researcher's suggestions.

Miriam - "Actually, all that I'm seeing is their heads but now that you said whole thing I'm seeing Dad's body."

"... if you (researcher) would suggest things, that would happen to the image."

Researcher: "Can you think of an example?"

"Like the temperature one. I wasn't feeling any temperature, and there might have been, but I just wasn't aware of it, but then when you said it, right away I felt warmth, and then I thought, well, potentially one parent image could be warmer than the other. But I don't really think that's something I attend to."

The researcher's suggestion has directed attention to a specific aspect of the image (temperature), which transforms as a result. The transformation of the image differs from those described in the Dynamism - spontaneity - integrity theme because the changes are deliberately intended. It should be remembered that some aspects of the image are immune to suggestion or alteration (see inherent structure theme).

7. Image reveals differentiation of parental qualities. When the co-researchers are asked to see their parents standing together, it is immediately obvious that the parental qualities are differentiated, and reflect either opposite or complementary characteristics.

Rachel - "Dad's area (space around the image) would be quite quiet. Mother's would have a kind of whirlwind around it, kind of a hustle and bustle, real sense of movement although none is apparently going on."

Mark - "My image of her ... she's wearing white and her hair is greying and she's very pure, good. ... My dad's definitely brown. He's definitely not a good character in my life."

Jill - "... Mom's (color) is much more clear and distinct and vivid. It's a very distinct blue. And Dad's is a, like I said, it's kind of a hazier mustardier color ... brown ... not quite as distinct."

"I don't think I could change it, no (the parental image). I

mean I could dress them in different colors (laughter) but the energy that I feel is basically the same."

The colors, activity and physical stance of each parent describe that person's individual characteristics. For most co-researchers, the differentiation involved "opposites" wherein one quality was judged to be better than the other. However for some, like Hilary, the parental qualities were seen to be complementary (mother as visceral and emotional; father as "laid back" and a thinker). In each case, the parents' individual characteristics were clearly distinguished.

8. Image reveals perceptions of parents not previously recognized.

The image often reveals perceptions of the parents not previously recognized and causes the co-researchers to re-evaluate their relationships to them.

Mark - "For me it (the EPT) brings up a whole bunch of thoughts about my family and my parents that maybe I wouldn't have thought of them in that way before. I would have thought of them in sort of . . . like my dad's a complete write-off . . . and my mother's perfect."

"... that's the way I thought about them but it seems to me doing that (the EPT) maybe puts a caveat on those interpretations of people."

The visual image mirrors the parents actual characteristics but also expresses parental qualities not previously acknowledged, as Mark indicates when he says "I wouldn't have thought of them in that way before." The image challenges assumptions Mark has made about his parents and as a result he is led to reconsider his impressions. These unacknowledged impressions have the quality of being known and yet not known. For example, Mark previously thought of his father as a complete write-off and his mother as perfect. After doing the Eidetic Parents Test, he became less judgmental about his father and began to recognize him as someone less ogreish than he originally thought. This did not

come as a complete surprise to Mark, but was a new way of looking at his father. It was as if Mark re-remembered other aspects of his father's character. The newly revealed aspects were "known" at some level all along, but Mark did not recognize his father's more positive qualities when taking the point of view "my father's a complete write-off."

There can be a sense of struggle with the image if it reflects qualities that the co-researcher does not want to recognize. At these times the co-researcher may "forget" what is before him, as in the following examples:

William - "I know what I'm thinking, and it's that she (mother) is always doing what my father says."

Researcher: "Like, you want her to be more herself, you want her to express herself?"

"Yes, and I want--what I'm going to say now is associated with just recent feelings, in that . . . oh, I forget."

Researcher: "You were talking about how she always does what your dad says."

"Yes. Oh, now I remember. It's that I want her to be more than a mother to me. She's always been almost like a perfect little mother. I want her to dance."

William - "It's not clear (father's face). It's not clear and there's something unhappy about it. I want it to come together as a smile, but it won't come together as a smile."

In the first example, William forgets what he had intended to say in connection with recent feelings about his mother, and these turn out to be feelings of dissatisfaction with her passivity. In the second example, the father's face is unhappy, vague and unclear. It won't "come together as a smile" as William wants it to. He does not see the unhappy visage clearly and would prefer not to see it at all. The vague, unhappy face is one that William knows and yet does not want to know. When the co-researcher does not want to recognize qualities of

the parent that are dimly perceived, there is often a visual or semantic vagueness. It seems to be a way of "forgetting" what is dimly known. Clarity of the image is a way of knowing clearly.

9. Sensory details of an image are vivid containers of experience.

Sensory details of the image hold a multitude of events and experiences. This was illustrated as co-researchers recounted descriptions of their childhood home. In the image of home dwells childhood:

Hilary - (describing her image of home) "Just your normal one level bungalow in yellow and brown trim and a huge lawn and backyard and lots of flowers and a playhouse and a sandbox and a garden and a forest in the back."

"... lots of good feelings and experiences rushed back (when describing the home), a series of flashbacks to childhood."

William - "O.K., it's got red brick on either side of the door. It's got green trimming. It's got a large tree in the backyard. That was S.'s tree. I'm getting a lot of pictures here about the whole yard and the whole house."

Mark - Researcher: "O.K., I'd like you to put that whole picture (of home) aside."
"Easy for you to say! (Why?) My whole childhood! (laughter)."

The sensory details of home hold memories and perceptions of childhood and these small details contain a whole life.

10. The image has its own time. The image has its own time which does not necessarily correspond to things as they are in "actual" or "present" time. William was in the process of describing an image when he noted "I've completely switched times. Or there's no time to it." There are different moments of time contained in the image simultaneously, as when Hilary described having a rush of flashbacks to childhood when seeing her image of home. The image reflects past and present: "It's like the images have histories to them" (Miriam).

In the following example, Hilary's image of her mother reflects how

her mother looked when Hilary was a pre-teen. Hilary states that this was the age when her emotional relationship to her mother crystallized, although intellectually Hilary continued to re-examine the relationship:

Hilary - "She (mother) has got very short black hair that's salt and pepper now."

Researcher: "What is it like in the image?"

"It's jet black. She's had the same style for so long."

(Later) "... intellectually, how I view my mother has changed (since pre-teens), but emotionally it's very much the same."

The image has collapsed past and present time and seems to inhabit an emotional time which follows its own laws.

11. The language of the image is poetic. The image is poetic. It speaks in the language of metaphors. Rachel talks about her father having "a green image to him" because she did not see him much in her childhood. The relationship between "green" and "lack of contact" is not direct and concrete, but allusive and metaphorical. For Rachel, the color green has a meaning in the context of her relationship to father, one that she understands in a metaphorical way.

At times the meaning of the image is ambiguous, as when Miriam saw images that "were like paisleys that were changing form and swirling around clockwise. After that they were just meshing." The paisleys succeeded images of her parents and were possibly a transformation of them. Miriam could not say exactly what the paisleys were, but their swirling, continuous movement spoke to her in a poetic fashion, and she did not feel so "stuck" in feelings of sadness at missing her parents.

Sometimes the image is almost inarticulate and defies words.

Mark - "They (parents) are moving (floating around each other) but

they're also encased in this plastic. It's not a plastic, but it could be like . . . well, the closest thing would be to call it plastic. They're being encased in it. It's like clouds, but they're clear and fluffy, but clear."

Mark gropes for words in order to describe the substance that encases each parent like a cocoon. He has to use metaphors to approximate description--like plastic, like clouds, but clear and fluffy--because the image itself is speaking in an elusive language. Even though Mark cannot specify the substance of the casing, he can apprehend the symbolic meaning:

It could mean that they're in some stage . . . where they're freer than they were before, but they're still encased. . . they're still trapped in something.

Thus, the language of the image is poetry and symbols.

12. There is discrimination among different kinds of imagery experiences. In doing the Eidetic Parents Test, the co-researchers were able to discriminate between the eidetic parent image and other kinds of imagery experiences. In the example below, Miriam can discriminate between picture images and the eidetic image.

Miriam - "(image of father is) Extremely stagnant. . . . But now I've pictures of him that I've looked at recently and I'm picturing the pictures. The image is becoming more vibrant and more real."

Researcher: "As you remember the pictures, the image of your father is changing?"

"Yes, and the same with my mother now."

Researcher: "How is it changing?"

"Well, I see him sitting with his feet in hot water."

Researcher: "Is that one of the pictures?"

"Hmm. And now I can see him moving, he's actively moving. Turning around and smiling and being corny and that kind of thing. So the picture--the images come alive."

Researcher: "Now, which images are you talking about?"

"I didn't say images. The picture is coming alive, of my father. I'm actually picturing an event that happened before."

Researcher: "When you look at the original one (image) of them standing, has there been any change in that?"

"When you say that, it's the same one."

Miriam prefers a vibrant, humorous "picture" of her father to the stagnant eidetic image. She does not want to see the negative image of her beloved father. However, she knows clearly which picture she has actively visualized (constructed) and which image is the spontaneous eidetic one. The co-researchers in the Dynamic group found that the eidetic image was related to dream images, hypnogogic images and memories, but was not identical to them.

Imagery plays a unique role in each person's life and the co-researcher's own experience of imagery provides a context which can enrich the Eidetic Parents Test.

Jill - "Well, I would describe myself as having a particularly rich visual life. If I just want to tune out a lecture or something, I'll just imagine something else or somebody else."

Rachel - "I used to be able to walk into a room and see colors . . . I guess some people would call them auras or something. But I'd walk in and if I saw greenish, it usually put me on guard."

The co-researchers' familiarity with mental imagery pre-disposes them to be sensitive to nuances of the eidetic image and to be able to discriminate among different imagery experiences.

The third order themes for the remaining two protocols (the Static group) reveal a significantly different cluster of imagery experiences.

B. Third Order Themes - Static Protocols

1. The image has a static, photographic quality. For Gary and Candice, the parental images have a stiff, static quality to them, as if the parents were posing for a photograph.

Gary - "Dad has his arm around Mom, as if posing for a photograph. He has kind of a forced smile on. It's kind of the image I have of them when he's doing a self-timed photograph, which he does a lot of . . ."

"... because it is this photographic image, I don't know if this is going to be a trap or not, I mean having formed this kind of photographic thing . . . and by photographic image I mean as if posing for a photograph, so they're fairly still, not too active."

The images "retain" their pose throughout the exercise.

Researcher (near the end of the interview): "Is there anything else you could tell me about it (the image) at this point?"

Candice - "No, they still seem to be in the same position."

There is very little change in the images from the beginning to the end of the session and they show little, if any spontaneous movement. It is this static quality that differentiates Gary's and Candice's protocols from the other six. All of the other co-researchers experienced a sense of liveliness and involvement when seeing the parental images.

2. The co-researcher is not emotionally involved in the image but is neutral and distant. The image seems to have little emotional impact on the co-researcher, who remains almost "untouched" by it.

Candice - "I'm probably taking a very objective view at the moment, rather than subjective."

"I seem to be a little more distant than when I first saw the picture. I was probably closer. Now it seems a little more distant."

The image is felt to be entirely realistic with little emotional impact, as in the following example:

Gary - (Describing reversal of right-left positions of parents)
 "... it's harder for me to see Dad putting his left arm on Mom, which it would be because the other way it's his right arm. Like he's right-handed and I think that would be his natural way of doing it, so to get him to do his left hand is just a little more awkward and not quite ... that's all I can explain. I think it's nothing too profound."

Gary explains the awkwardness his father appears to have when he's on the left side in an entirely literal manner. He takes pains to point out that his father is right-handed and warns the researcher not to search too deeply for meaning. Gary does not respond to the emotional aspects of seeing his father in an awkward position and does not appear to entertain this possibility. Overall, the co-researchers tend to respond in a cool concrete manner, as if they were describing a neutral scene or a picture of little personal impact.

3. There is little kinesthetic involvement in the image. In these two protocols, the co-researcher does not become "bodily" involved with the image:

Researcher: "Do you notice any feelings or sensations in your body as you look at that image?"

Candice - "Hmmm . . . Not really."

This response is consistent with the more neutral and distant relationship which tends to characterize the imagery experience for Candice and Gary. Neither of them mention any physical or visceral response to the parental image. The image is very much perceived as "out there" with little personal connection to the co-researcher.

4. The image has literal meaning only. The image has a superficial meaning only and is not felt to have any larger significance. In the examples below, it is mainly physical attributes of the parents which are revealed. There is a reluctance to "read into" the image for signs of the parents' emotional disposition or character traits.

Candice - "My mom's got short red hair . . . my father's got short dark hair. A lot of people say that he's always kept the haircut from being an officer in the air force . . ."

Gary - "(Mother is) pretty compliant, I would say. But there's nothing to be really uncompliant about, I mean, you go along with the photographer and do what he wants, as a rule."

The parental image is perceived as situation specific and without any larger meaning. It seems that the co-researcher feels there is an entirely rational explanation for the image. Gary clearly suggests that this is the most appropriate way to understand the image.

Gary - "... The light would be a little more illuminated on my mom's side and that has nothing to do with my mom at all except that the sun is reflecting off the water. ... I don't know, I wouldn't read too much into that."

Gary - "He's doing a self-timed photograph, which he does a lot of. ... My image is with him with Mom by the rock at the cottage. I don't know where the camera is because it would have to be out in the water."

Those aspects of the image which defy rational explanation (such as the camera having to be in the water) are not felt to be significant.

5. Parental qualities are not well differentiated. For Candice, the parental images tend to be vague and this makes it difficult for her to identify individual characteristics of her mother and father.

Researcher: "Can you tell me anything about the way they're standing, the expressions on their faces?"

Candice - "No, I just see them as two people, not that close that I can define the expression."

She sees them just as "two people." The parents do not express clearly differentiated qualities of personality.

Gary - "I don't think I can describe individually the character of space they're sharing because I think it's a mutual space."

Candice - "I view them as an entity together rather than as individuals."

For both Candice and Gary, parents are seen as a unified couple whose individual differences are poorly discriminated.

6. The co-researcher actively constructs the image. For the Static group, the co-researchers actively construct the image and for the most part, have a sense of being in control.

Researcher: Do you have to exert an effort to change them (the images)?"

Gary - "No, it just maybe feels more comfortable if Mom is on the left and Dad is on the right, but I can move them around any way I like. I've a lot of power. Because they're just images, you see. I'm just playing with images."

There is some awareness of the image resisting the co-researcher's manipulations (e.g., during reversal of parents' positions) but the resistance is felt to be weak.

Candice - (Upon reversing parents' right-left position): "I just see them the other way around now. Though it appears fairly uncomfortable."

Both Gary and Candice are able to switch the parents' positions with relative ease, although they experience some uncomfortable feelings when doing so. This contrasts markedly with the co-researchers of the Dynamic group, many of whom had great difficulty in altering what seemed to be an inherent structure of the image.

7. Caution, doubt and uncertainty characterize relationship between co-researcher and researcher, and also characterize attitude towards the Eidetic Parents Test. In these two protocols, the co-researchers are not comfortable with the interviewer or with the imagery exercise itself. They are hesitant and cautious when describing their experiences and are concerned about the researcher's response to them.

Gary - "I can see there might be problems in defining a lot of this, like what is 'vividly' because internal perception or how we represent internal images--like, how do you know what's in my mind as compared to what you would see? ..."

"... that's all I can explain. I think it's nothing too profound."

"That's the characteristic of their space. I don't know, I wouldn't read too much into that."

". . . I don't know if this is going to be a trap or not, I mean having formed this kind of photographic thing . . ."

Candice - ". . . It's hard to give comments . . . probably due to the fact that I'm not on familiar ground."

"Like, anything. I tend to pick up a lot from observation. Like, if I was to sit down and talk to you about a few things, maybe I would be able to give my interpretations (of the imagery) a little more. But I will tend to listen if there are other people out, before I'll give my own views."

There is a sense of mistrust about the whole affair--mistrust of the co-researcher and the imagery exercise itself. This was confirmed by the fact that one of the co-researchers later confided to the writer that he thought the writer was out to trick him, as he had often been "tricked" in other psychological studies. Candice and Gary's uneasiness with the research process indicates that the relationship between researcher and participant is an important dimension in the imagery experience, and one that is also implicit in the Dynamic protocols.

8. The image cannot be clearly discriminated from other imagery experiences. For Candice and Gary, the image is often vague and there is an absence of sensory detail.

Candice - "I have no feeling of temperature, just of sight. No, there's no color difference (in the image) or shading difference, actually."

Candice sees her parents as "just two people" and only began to notice details after much prodding by the researcher. There is no clear discrimination between the Eidetic Parents Test image and other imagery, such as memory.

Gary - "I have very clear images of that, or clear memories, and there's not much association (kinesthetic) with them, so they've got to be visual."

"It the kind of image I have of them when he's doing a self-

timed photograph."

Candice - Researcher: "Is that an actual memory, or is that something you just sort of see when I ask you to see that?"

- "No, that's what I see . . . I guess it's a memory because my parents do tend to talk a lot."

In these protocols, the parent image does not present the co-researchers with an experience that is surprising or unusual to them. The "view" of the parents is entirely consistent with the co-researcher's usual thoughts and judgments about them, and the Eidetic Parents Test is by no means a unique experience.

C. Fourth Order Themes and Descriptions of Imagery Experiences

The final stage of the thematic analysis involved collapsing and re-grouping the major themes of the Dynamic protocols and the Static ones. This was the final abstraction of essential elements of the imagery experience. William's response to his mother's image, presented at the beginning of this chapter, ultimately contributed to theme A in Table IV. His dissatisfaction with her passivity and inability to make her do just as he wanted, is part of the final theme derived as "Felt-presence, integrity of the image is strong." Results are presented in Table IV and Table V. Underneath each major theme are listed the third order themes that contributed to this final abstraction. Table IV presents the fourth order themes for the Dynamic protocols, and a description of the Dynamic imagery experience based upon this abstraction follows the table. A similar procedure is used for Table V and a description of the Static protocols follows that table.

Table IV

Fourth Order Themes - Dynamic Protocols

A. Felt-presence, integrity of the image is strong.

- dynamism-spontaneity-autonomy
- inherent structure
- differentiation of parental qualities

B. Image and co-researcher are responsive to each other

- mutual emotional responsiveness
- kinesthetic responsiveness
- image responds to verbal suggestions
- (dynamism-spontaneity-autonomy)

C. During eidetic imagery, the co-researcher participates in a world which is:

- timeless
- poetic
- meaningful
- vivid (sensory detail)
- has its own unique perception of people and events
- eidetic imagery experience is distinctive

Description - Dynamic Protocols

The eidetic parent images are like real personages; their presence can be felt as much as if they had a tangible existence of their own. These personages act as if they had their own thoughts and feelings and cannot be easily swayed from their natural stance or course of action. They can transform spontaneously as if revealing to the imager new and sometimes mysterious aspects of their character. Their willfulness, spontaneity and dynamism convince the imager of the images' integrity.

The eidetic parent images have autonomy, but they are also responsive to the imager, as the imager is to them. It seems that the two "co-constitute" each other. It is as if there were a real relationship unfolding. The imager feels acknowledged when the image transforms in response to his or her thoughts, feelings and sensations. There is the give and take of a real relationship: the image preserves its integrity and yet responds to some suggestions; and the imager alternately seeks to discover who the personage is and or seeks to escape this knowledge.

The eidetic image involves the imager in an imaginal world where the boundaries of seeing and feeling, past and present, real and unreal are loosened. The imager participates in this world which is vividly sensual, which is poetic and echoes its message through metaphors of space, energy, color and temperature. This message is already known, but is discovered and understood in a new way. The dynamic tension between knowing and not knowing, remembering and forgetting, seeing and not seeing, is all part of the dance between image and imager.

Table V

Fourth Order Themes - Static Protocols

- A. Felt-presence of the image is weak
- image has a static, photographic quality
 - imager tends to construct image
(image lacks dynamism, spontaneity)
 - parental qualities are undifferentiated, vague
- B. Relationship between imager and image is split and tends to be one-sided (impact is from the imager onto the image).
- imager has a neutral and distant relationship to the image
 - little kinesthetic involvement
 - imagery experience characterized by doubt, hesitation and uncertainty
- C. Imagery is felt not to be significant, or only superficially significant
- image has literal meaning only
 - image is not clearly discriminated from other imagery experiences

Description - Static Protocols

The parental images have no real presence of their own. They could be memories or from pictures, it is hard to tell. Sometimes, they cannot be seen clearly at all, as if mother and father are together in a haze, and are difficult to tell apart from each other. When the images are clear they're like photographs, rigid and still, or like any scene that the imager could invent. The images have the quality of a cut-out or some other flimsy object that could easily be moved around. Occasionally, there are slight feelings of discomfort when the images are moved.

For the most part, however, the images are rather distant and there is nothing compelling about them--emotionally or sensually--that involves the imager. There is a marked separation between imager and image, a real sense of dichotomy between the two. The imager feels rather uncertain about this whole business of imagery, and about its value. The imager is also not sure what he or she should be seeing, or what is safe to tell the researcher.

The images are not felt to be particularly significant and there is some fear that the researcher will read too much into them. After all, the images are just pictures, like photos or paintings or memories, and their meaning is obvious. There is nothing obscure about them, nothing that can't be explained.

VII. GENERAL DISCUSSION

A. Phenomenological Analysis and Ahsen's Theory

The findings of the analysis of the Dynamic group of protocols are consistent with many of Ahsen's statements about the nature of eidetic imagery. Ahsen (1977b) has described eidetic imagery as a dynamic structure which reflects the nuclear experience of an event. He has declared that the eidetic image can only be altered according to its incipient tendencies, which follow their own inner laws (Ahsen 1972, 1977b). In summary, the image has a corporeity of its own and a key element of eidetics is their dynamism and autonomy.

A number of themes in the present data support these aspects of Ahsen's theory. The major theme for the Dynamic protocols, "Dynamism-spontaneity-autonomy," illustrates the sense of presence that the image gives and its tendency to "behave" spontaneously. This element, combined with the "inherent-structure" theme, confirms that the image has "incipient tendencies" which manifest themselves in transformations of the image. Although superficial aspects of the image could be altered, the co-researchers were unable to change its basic structure at will, even if they were displeased with the image before them. The transformative nature of the image also seemed to be associated with attention to extremes, especially extremely negative elements, and with emotional responsivity. These findings are consistent with Ahsen's suggestion that the image has a bi-polar nature and that in order to recover the original perceptions embedded in the image, a person must acknowledge both its positive and negative aspects (Ahsen 1973, 1977a). This process is illustrated in the examples given for the theme of mutual emotional responsiveness.

Ahsen differs from the typological school of eidetics in his insistence that the eidetic image is a highly personal response to the world and encodes a person's original perceptions without the interference of conscious superstructures (Ahsen 1973, 1977b). The co-researcher's emotional involvement in the image demonstrated the fact that it represented a highly personal response. Although the subject content of the exercise, one's parents, is by nature a personal one, the co-researchers in the Static group did not respond to the parental images in the same manner. They reacted neutrally and even distantly to this highly personal topic. Therefore, for the Dynamic group, it was not the content alone which represented a personal response, but the involvement in the image. The eidetic also preserved the imagers' original perceptions of parents, as illustrated in the theme "Image reveals perceptions of parents not previously recognized." These perceptions were characterized by a quality of "being known and yet not known," and sometimes startled the co-researchers into re-considering their conscious pre-judgments about their parents.

Eidetic imagery is typically described as repeatable and vivid images, and Ahsen asserts that this is true for the structural images elicited by the Eidetic Parents Test (Ahsen 1972). The images of the Dynamic protocols were characterized by emotional impact, vividness and presence of sensory detail. The interviews were all at least one hour each and all of the co-researchers of this group sustained the images for lengthy periods of time with ease.

Another major aspect of Ahsen's theory is the suggestion that the eidetic is comprised of a visual element (image), somatic response, and meaning component. The acronym ISM denotes this tri-partite structure

of the eidetic: "I (image portraying a situation); S (somatic state, representing body feelings and emotions attached to the image); M (meaning of the image)" (Ahsen, 1977, p. 17). Themes derived from the phenomenological analysis of the interviews support the ISM structure of an eidetic. In the Dynamic group, all co-researchers reported seeing an image which was usually vivid and had sensory detail. "Emotional involvement in the image" and "kinesthetic responsiveness to the image" were themes that described the somatic state. Several themes alluded to the meaningfulness of the image within the context of the co-researcher's life, such as "Image has multi-levels of meaning," "Image reveals differentiation of parental qualities," and "Image reveals perceptions of parents not previously recognized." Ahsen's major purpose in declaring that the eidetic has an ISM structure is to emphasize that the image is not merely a visual phenomena. The themes derived from the Dynamic protocols clearly illustrate the multi-faceted and holistic nature of the eidetic.

Various other themes, such as the timeless and poetic nature of the image are echoed in Ahsen's work. In Basic Concepts of Eidetic Psychotherapy (1977), Ahsen gives a lucid account of the magical, poetic nature of images and how they reveal fundamental structures of mind.

The analysis of the Static protocols clearly does not support Ahsen's description of eidetics. The imagery responses of this group are characterized by a static, photographic quality, lack of "presence," little sense of dynamism or spontaneity, little emotional or kinesthetic involvement, and a sense of visually constructing the image. The implication is that administration of the Eidetic Parents Test does not automatically elicit what Ahsen would call an eidetic. The

constellation of themes of the Dynamic group corresponds closely to an eidetic experience while those of the Static group do not. The sessions with Gary and Candice are viewed as a failure to elicit the full eidetic response. The imagery experiences for the Static group shared features which were more similar to memory images or active visualization than a structural eidetic. It could be argued that the responses of the Static group represented a split ISM, with the image component consciously experienced and the somatic state and meaning components suppressed. However, such an assertion requires that a pre-conceived theory be imposed upon the data. Phenomenologically speaking, it can only be stated that the themes for the Static group do not reflect an eidetic imagery experience.

The influence of the relationship between researcher and co-researcher is possibly a key in understanding why the Static protocols were different. The mistrust and uneasiness experienced as part of the whole exercise constitutes a major difference in the self-world dimension. The Mitwelt, the primary dynamic of "being-with-others" (Keen, 1975) was fundamentally different for Gary and Candice than for the other co-researchers. As such, it is not surprising that the resulting themes were different as well.

Carol Becker has noted that "the art of creating just the right atmosphere for the verbal unfolding of a phenomenon has preoccupied all human science researchers" (Becker, 1986, p. 112). It is apparent that Gary and Candice did not feel at ease with the researcher, either because of researcher or the nature of the task. Gary confided later that he simply did not believe that the researcher was honest when explaining the purpose of the study, because he was accustomed to being

duped and given false explanations when participating in psychological experiments. This is particularly revealing, because experimental researchers often conceal the purpose of their study and lie to their subjects in an effort to avoid contaminating the data. This creates a sense of betrayal on the part of the subject, and in Gary's case, suspicion and mistrust of the researcher. Such feelings would certainly affect Gary's participation in any research process, whether phenomenological or experimental. He has been taught to be suspicious, and paradoxically this constitutes the very "contamination of the data" that other researchers were trying to avoid in the first place.

Candice's comments indicated that the experience of mental imagery was new to her and that in unfamiliar situations she preferred to stand back and wait before becoming involved.

Candice - "It's hard to give comments . . . probably due to the fact that I'm not on familiar ground."

- "I tend to pick up a lot from observation . . . I will tend to listen if there are other people out, before I give my own views."

She is not willing to risk giving her own views because she is unfamiliar with the imagery and unfamiliar with the researcher. She suggests that she is not ready to jump in until she feels sure of herself and sure of who she is with. For Candice, there is possibly a lack of readiness, of "adequatio" when confronted with the imagery situation.

In summary, Ahsen's theory is validated by the results of thematic analysis of the Dynamic protocols. The results of the Static protocols have quite likely been influenced by a disturbance in the relationship between researcher and co-researcher (for a variety of reasons) and they suggest an imagery experience which is structurally different from an

eidetic one.

B. Present Study and Other Eidetic Imagery Research

Most researchers have followed Haber and Haber's (1979) example of using an externally presented stimulus to study the nature of eidetic imagery. The writer wonders if such researchers have been misled by the perceptual character of the eidetics into using techniques which automatically eliminate a personal response to the imagery. Such techniques have stymied the efforts of Haber and Haber and others and have led them to suggest that the key in understanding eidetics is phenomenology. The present study has elucidated the nature of the person's experience during imagery and, as such, has remedied somewhat the imbalance that occurred by focussing only on the images.

The results of the present study provide additional evidence that the imager's emotional involvement and the vivid, dynamic character of the eidetic image are significant features that cannot be overlooked. In fact, spontaneous and dynamic transformations of images elicited by stimulus presentation methods is an oft-reported "side-effect" in "traditional" research (Ahsen, 1977b; Haber, 1979). The use of an external stimulus picture to elicit eidetic imagery emphasizes a memory model of eidetic imagery and focuses attention on accurate reproduction of the stimulus. Haber himself (1979) has noted that these are not useful criteria for identifying eidetic imagery. Moreover, as stricter criteria are used in the picture-stimulus procedure (e.g., more complex picture, more accurate recall), fewer and fewer subjects give the required "eidetic" response. It is as if eidetics are will-o'-the-wisps: as researchers become more experimentally demanding, the eidetic image becomes more elusive. Nevertheless, prominent researchers such as

Doob (1966), Haber (1964, 1979), Kluver (1928), and Luria (1960), are convinced that the eidetic image is an identifiable phenomenon.

Husserl (1977) has pointed out the danger of empirical psychology's lack of proper eidetic [meaning essential structure] foundation, without which subsequent methodological procedures, however sophisticated, may be inappropriate and worthless. (Wertz, 1984, p. 34).

It seems that experimental researchers of eidetic imagery have fallen into precisely this trap. The results of the present study confirm that an understanding of the imager's experience is crucial to the investigation of eidetics.

It has been suggested that eidetic imagery is the kind of anomaly in psychology that leads to a paradigm shift (see commentary by Hannay in Haber, 1979). Eidetic imagery constitutes a "deviation from the normal that can only be 'saved' by some adjustment, more or less radical, in our theoretical grasp of the whole area" (ibid., p. 603). Overall, it appears that the field of eidetics requires new theories and new methods of research to successfully explore the topic. The present study is a step in this direction.

C. Additional Comments - Imagery in General

The results of the present study are supported by research investigating the connection between imagery and the body. Jacobsen's (1929, 1930) study of minute muscular responses to imaginal activity is consistent with co-researchers describing visceral and kinesthetic responses to the image. Penfield's (1959, 1963) work on eliciting vivid imagery by stimulating the interpretive cortex supports the notion that seemingly forgotten experiences and perceptions are somehow stored in imagery form, and are accessible at a later date. The studies on cerebral laterality indicate that the right hemisphere mediates imagery.

and Ley (1983) summarizes these findings by stating that:

The neurophysiological organization of the right hemisphere seems tailored for synthesizing 'data' from perceptual, visceral and motor sensory domains, across space and time into a superordinate whole. (Ley, 1983, p. 278)

These findings support the themes of vividness, sensory detail, kinesthetic and emotional involvement that emerged from the Dynamic protocols.

The experimental research on imagery measures performance on laboratory tasks and it stresses the deliberate construction of imagery as well as imagery's role in information processing (Kosslyn, 1979; Paivio, 1979). In this kind of research, imagery is regarded as an adjunct to memory and learning and is often reduced to the status of epi-phenomena. Some, such as Pylyshyn, suggest that scientific research cannot even prove that imagery exists (in Ley, 1983). The present study indicates that the element of personal experience and meaning is crucial to imagery although it is overlooked in many experimental studies. Also, the present study has found that the visual aspect of the image is but one of its many dimensions. To study the visual representation alone is to miss other essential elements. A human science approach remedies this narrowness by studying imagery in a holistic fashion.

The oneirotherapies (waking-dream therapies) and other clinical uses of imagery indicate that certain kinds of imagery have an inherent structure which can be altered only according to a natural progression (Assagioli, 1965, 1973; Hannah, 1981; Leuner, 1969; Watkins, 1976). It seems that such therapies proceed by way of revealing and integrating the image's dynamic structure. The themes of "Dynamism-spontaneity-autonomy," "Emotional involvement," "Kinesthetic involvement" and

"Inherent structure" are all consistent with such a process. The image therapies also emphasize the multi-dimensional aspects of imagery and this stress on emotional, kinesthetic and sensory channels as well as visual elements supports the findings of the present study.

D. Comments on Methodology

The relationship of the present study to more "traditional" eidetic imagery research requires an examination of the fundamental implications of the research paradigm used. Traditional eidetic research uses a methodology founded on principles of natural science, and this paradigm does not lend itself easily to explicating people's personal experience of eidetic imagery. Such an approach decontextualizes imagery from human experience in the interests of methodological convenience. As a result, the whole experience loses meaning. The phenomenological method was chosen in an effort to recapture the human context of eidetic imagery.

The phenomenological analysis of the protocols was essentially a hermeneutic process and as such, other interpretations of the data are always possible. However, I would venture to say that additional interpretations are likely to illuminate different aspects of the imagery experience, rather than invalidate the present analysis. Different interpretations of a poem are possible, and if supported by the structure and content of the poem itself, they are all acceptable.

Giorgi notes that validity refers in part to the claim

that if any other researcher assumes the attitude described by the researcher, then he should be able to perceive and understand the same meanings. (Giorgi, 1975, p. 78)

Earlier in this work, it was suggested that the question "Is the interpretation supported by the data?" should be kept in mind when

reviewing the thematic analysis. Salner (1986) has made it clear that the domain of human science is socially constructed facts and intersubjective meanings (see also Taylor, 1979). As such, any interpretation of this social context is by nature incomplete and can always be supplemented by other interpretations.

Wertz's comments on validity emphasize the importance of identifying a "truly psychological" topic and of a valid fore-understanding of what the phenomena is (Wertz, 1984). As a dimension of consciousness, imagery is a truly psychological phenomena. The matter of fore-understanding of the phenomena is more problematic, because there is much confusion in the field of eidetics. However, the writer's own experience of imagery provides some understanding of the nature of different kinds of imagery and makes it possible to discriminate among imagery experiences. This is in contrast to the requirements for experimental researchers, some of whom might see images themselves.

A consultation with both Gary and Candice regarding the major themes derived from their protocols would have strengthened the present study. Unfortunately, such a validation process was not possible because neither of these two people were available. Consultation with four co-researchers of the Dynamic group confirmed that the themes derived from their protocols accurately captured the essential elements of their experience. No theme was found to be inappropriate and none of the co-researchers thought that an important element had been overlooked. The significance of the major theme, "Dynamism-spontaneity-autonomy" was confirmed. However, it must be remembered that my own personal experience of imagery pre-disposes me to be sensitive to experiences of the co-researchers in the Dynamic group. That same bias

could have made me less accurate and appreciative of Gary's and Candice's experiences. Also, there was some tension and uneasiness felt on Gary's and Candice's part during the sessions, and this could not have failed to involve me as well. Considering the differences in the sessions with these two co-researchers, it becomes obvious that "bracketing" my own expectations and pre-judgments about imagery was an important exercise.

The interviews with Gary and Candice actually proved valuable by throwing into relief the significant elements of the Dynamic group of protocols. Other researchers "have found that contrasting groups of subjects or diverse single subjects are productive in arriving at essential views of the phenomena" (Becker, 1986, p. 106).

E. Conclusion

The themes derived from the Dynamic group of protocols validate Ahsen's theory that eidetic imagery involves vivid, durable images with their own dynamic structure. The results indicate that there is such a thing as eidetic imagery and that it can be discriminated from other imagery experiences using a phenomenological analysis of responses. Eidetic imagery appears to be a much more involving experience and more personally significant than has been suggested by other research methods. The thematic analysis suggests that the phenomenological method may be useful in distinguishing different kinds of imagery experiences, as revealed in the two different constellations of themes which emerged from the Dynamic group and the Static group. The analysis also shows the value of a complementarity of methods in eidetic imagery research.

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APPENDIX A

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number *	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
** R	I'd like you to think of the house that you lived in most of the time with your parents, the house that gives you the feeling of a home. Can you see a picture of that in your mind's eye? (Yes.) You might find it helpful to close your eyes. It might make it easier to concentrate. If that is not as easy for you, feel free to open them, but it's often easier to see the images with your eyes closed.... Can you just describe that house to me briefly?		

* Note: Only the co-researcher's responses are numbered.

** R = Researcher; Co = Co-Researcher

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
1	Co - O.K. It's got red brick on either side of the door. It has green trimming. It's got a large tree in the back yard. That was S.'s grade one tree. I'm getting a lot of pictures here about the whole yard and the whole house.	- physical attributes of house - red brick door, color, material features - tree - connected to S. (brother) - many images, whole yard	- details are story
	R - Are they in succession or sort of many different aspects of that environment?		
2	Co - A lot of different aspects. I'm just remembering the potato garden in the front, the sidewalk. It wasn't completed when we got there, it was completed after we got there. I remember the basement. I remember the movers going in. I remember the basement floor. I got in shit for that . . . the wood floor of the dining room. A window looking out to the back alley.	- images simultaneous - many aspects simultaneous - physical features: garden, sidewalk, basement, window - conflict over misdeed in basement.	- physical attributes of the house hold events, experiences - details are a <u>whole</u> story.

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
	R - O.K. I'd like you to just see your parents in that house.		
3	Co - Well, Mom's making macaroni and the Flintstones are on (laughter). My Dad's getting ready to go to work. He's in the bathroom having a shave or whatever he does in the bathroom. Now my Dad's in the house and he's taking care of my little brother H.	- mother cooking - father shaving (?), in bathroom, preparing for work. - mother in kitchen: open (room), nurturing - father in bathroom: closed (room), isolated - now father nurtures (cares for brother).	- parental activity & location reveals the person, e.g., mother - available, nurturing; - father - unavailable, closed and available, nurturing to brother - image of the father changes when co-researcher attends to father's negative qualities - image of father is bi-polar?

R - Has he moved around, or what's happening? (My Dad?)
Yes, in the image . . .

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
4	Co - I've completely switched times. Or there's no time to it - my Dad was in the washroom a lot in the mornings when everybody was getting ready to go to school. And he was sick a lot, so my Dad was taking care of my little brother H. quite a bit. I'm getting an image of my dad play-fighting with me. R - What are some of the feelings associated with that image?	- image switches time, or is "no time." - father is in individual activity. - father nurtures - father play-fights - father ill.	- not so good (turns into) - good (turns into) - not-so-good - image of father is multi-valent?
5	Co - The feelings associated with him in the bathroom? I'm not comfortable. I guess he's - I don't know. He's not happy in the mornings. The image associated with play-fighting is a good one. And just a second ago I got another image - the good turned into not-so-good. Sometimes we accidentally	- bathroom - uncomfortable, unhappy, illness: father - uncomfortable, unhappy, illness - mornings are unhappy (not-so-good) - play-fighting is good and not-so-good - happy and unhappy - playing and fighting - innocent and hurtful	multivalence of image bi-polarity?

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
(5)	hurt our father when we were play-fighting, and then Dad would give us a spanking. . . . Did you want more images? R - Uh . . . what about your mom? What's the feeling associated with that image?		
6	Co - I think it's a combination of - somehow I miss her, and somehow a feeling that I have someone that I can talk to and understand. Someone that understands me. But I have this picture of my mother walking - walking through from the kitchen to the dining room and I'm just sitting watching - and it almost feels like there's - for some reason I'm missing her. R - O.K., I'd like you to set that whole image aside.	- miss mother (longing) - mother - communicates, understands, is open - mother walks from kitchen to the dining room - longing	- longing (for communication, understanding?)

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
	R - Now, just see your parents standing directly in front of you.		
7	Co - I feel intimidated - they're tall.	- parents standing in front - intimate, tallness	- image has a commanding presence
	R - Who's standing on your left and who's standing on your right?		
8	Co - My mother's standing on my left, my father's standing on my right. They're just standing very still.	- mother - left - father - right - stillness	
	R - Now, try to switch their positions.		
9	Co - It's difficult. I can see a picture of them in the other positions, but it's difficult. It feels far more natural the other way.	- difficult to switch, unnatural	- parents "belong" in a certain position
	R - What happens when you try to switch the positions?		

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
10	Co - The picture kind of fades easily, and I have to bring the picture back again . . . and, O.K., it's harder to picture my father on the left. My mother can be on the right - my father, it's harder for him to be on the left. R - Can you just - in their original positions with your mom on the left and your dad on the right - can you just describe to me what they look like, what they're wearing, the expression on their faces . . . to give me - (On their faces?) - or of their stance - just to explain to me what the image looks like?	- image fades when manipulated - mother - flexible - can be in either position - father rigid - easier in one position - limited	- image has "behavior" - e.g., fading, flexible, rigid - parental activity reveals the person - parental differences
11	Co - My mother's standing on the left and she's wearing about a knee-length dress. She has slippers on and her	- as Co-R attends to mother image (describe physical attributes), he sees her close up,	- attention to the image changes viewing perspective

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
(11)	hair is done in a bun. She has glasses on. When I start describing her, I start getting a closer view - I can't stand back any more.	can't stand back - loses "objectivity"?	
12	R - Is it like a close-up focus? Co - Yes. When I said my mom has a bun on her head, I look at her face and it's smiling a lot. She has little freckles. Yes, she's smiling, standing there.	- mother smiles - notice small details of face	
13	R - What are the feelings when you look at that? Co - Kind of happy. Her hair is turning grey, for some reason. She's just standing there smiling. My father, . . . he's not smiling. Now I get a picture of his face smiling	- happy feelings - mother's hair turns grey - puzzlement - father - not smiling - father - smiles in past - smile versus not smile, at ease versus	- multivalence of image, bi-polarity - father's image is ambiguous - transformation of image

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
(13)	but it doesn't feel in the present. It feels like when he's come back from a canoe trip or something. For some reason I pictured them standing there in an army "at ease" (laughter). He's going bald and has his glasses on. He keeps switching from the army "at ease" to standing fairly straight. R - When you see both of them standing in front of you, do they appear united or separated as a couple?	straighten, past versus present, - image switches time, position - amusement	
14	Co - Well, they are standing right beside each other. They appear united. R - What is it in the image that makes you say they appear united? What gives you that impression?	- standing beside each other, parents appear united	

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
15	Co - Nothing in the image really does that. They're standing close - a lot of people stand close. But they're both standing facing me. I just know. R - Are you aware of any sensations in your body when you look at either your mom or your dad in that image? Is there any place in your body that somehow seems affected?	- knows they're united, this knowledge is not from the image per se	- information, knowledge about image can come from sources other than the image itself - visual aspect of image does not contain its entire meaning
16	Co - My stomach a little bit, when I look at my father, it'll jump a little bit. R - Is there any difference in the space around them, like the atmosphere - such as, is one side brighter than the other? Are there any differences in temperature?	- seeing father makes the stomach jump	- image elicits bodily response

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
17	Co - There wasn't while I was imagining them before, but when you mentioned it, it seemed like my father's side went a little bit darker. It's a sad feeling when it goes darker. R - Is that sad feeling in your stomach? Co - It's a little bit higher - in the lower chest. R - Can you see that go brighter again - is there any way that can go brighter? Co - It goes brighter, but it's sort of when - it's sort of when I see him coming back when he's been away from the family. R - What about your mom's side - what is the light and temperature of that in	- researcher's suggestion leads to a change in the image. - father's side darkens - sad feelings - sadness in lower chest - brightness when father returns after absence.	- hypnotic suggestion? - image responds to words - color (light) is feeling - feeling is embodied

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
20	comparison? Like the space surrounding them. Co - The light is fairly bright - it's like if you're inside on a sunny day. Temperature's warm. With my father I guess I don't - I can't really feel temperature. R - In the image of them standing there in front of you, which appears to be more active and aggressive in the picture?	- mother - sunny, inside, warm - father - no temperature	
21	Co - My father. (Oh, yes?) What was the question again? R - Which - or who appears more active and aggressive in the picture - in the image?		
22	Co - Well, my mother has the smile, which gives her that - but my father has	- mother - smile - father - aggressive in spite of his	- meaning of image not entirely contained in visual aspect (table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
(22)	the feeling of being aggressive. He isn't doing anything - motion ... R - Is there a difference if I ask who's the more active or who's the more aggressive in that image?	motionlessness	
23	Co - Is there a difference between the two? R - Yes, the two, right.		
24	Co - Yes, active doesn't necessarily have to be aggressive. My mother's smiling and that's active. R - And your dad gives you the impression of aggressiveness? That image? (Yes.) O.K., what in the image gives that impression? Or - how do you know that - how do you come to that?	- smiling is active	

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
25	Co - The darkness does that, a little bit. For some reason, I can't completely put his face together. Most of the time, I can't completely put his face together, and I guess . . .	- darkness is aggressive - can't put father's face together - vagueness is aggressive	- co-researcher interprets image, meaning of fundamental elements (e.g., vagueness) to co-researcher is revealed
	R - . . . Can you explain to me what that means, "Can't put his face together?"		
26	Co - It's not clear. It's not clear and there's something unhappy about it. I want it to come together as a smile, but it won't come together as a smile.	- father's face is unclear - unhappiness - image does not respond to co-researcher's desires (i.e., wanting image to smile)	- vagueness is negative - autonomy of image - meaning of fundamental elements (e.g., darkness, vagueness is aggressive, unresponsive)

R - Is there a feeling of uncertainty, then, with that part of the image? What is the feeling for that, when his face doesn't come together?

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
27	Co - Anger . . . I guess I'd really like to have that face come together and be smiling. And then I keep going back to when he's smiling, coming home from a canoe trip! R - Now, how does that happen, when it goes from one to the other? Is there a flash to a totally different image, or how does that switch?	- anger at image's unresponsiveness - time change - to father smiling, return after long absence	- paradox: the co-researcher does not want the image he has - autonomy of the image, bi-polarity
28	Co - I try and look close at his face, and I get a little bit of an image from the past - he was coming home from a canoe trip. He was joking around. He had a toque on and it was boiling hot outside. He came knocking on the door and he was looking in the front - he was looking in the back door window - there's a small square window that he	- when co-researcher looks at father's face, gets image of father's return from canoe trip - amusing, playful	- co-researcher does not know which is his father's face

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
(28)	was looking in - looked pretty happy. R - O.K., what about your mom? What are some of your feelings about that? Are different parts of your body affected when you look at different parts of that image?		
29	Co - Right now she's standing there and she's happy. But my feeling isn't one of total happiness with her. As we've been discussing, I have gotten feelings of being unhappy with her. Right now I guess it's all she does is stand there with a smile. I want her to move around a bit. R - You want her to be more active?	- mother is standing, happy, passive, content - co-researcher is dissatisfied with her stillness - wants mother to be active	- paradox: dissatisfaction with image as given

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
30	Co - Yes, in the image, she's standing there		- dissatisfaction with image and desire to influence it
	R - What would you like her to do?		
31	Co - A strange thought came to my head - dance!	- wants mother to dance	- dissatisfaction with image and desire to influence it
	R - Yes? What kind of a dance?		
32	Co - Any kind! (laughter).		- dissatisfaction with image and desire to influence it
	R - Like a joyful one (Yes, any kind.) Is there more of a sense of a oneness of that image of your mom than with your dad? Between yourself and the image of your dad?		
33	Co - In a strange way, I feel even more distant from my mother than from my father.	- closer to father - distant from mother	- dissatisfaction with image and desire to influence it

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
	R - Are you talking about the image - the feeling for the image?		
34	Co - Yes. Because she won't - she doesn't dance.	- distant from mother because she's "still" - stillness, passivity alienate co-researcher.	- dissatisfaction with image and desire to influence it
	R - And your dad? . . . Could you explain that a bit to me? I don't really understand.		
35	Co - I guess in a way I feel partners in the darkness with him. I also feel partners in the sunlight, which always . . . I don't know if she just doesn't move.	- partners in darkness with father - also partners in sunlight, but uncertain, rejection if mother does not move.	↑ dissatisfaction with image as given
	R - I don't really understand what it is about your desire for her to dance. Is it that she's not expressing what she's feeling? Or how is it that		

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
	you want her to dance, and you feel distant from her?		
36	Co - I know what I'm thinking and it's that she's always doing what my father says. R - Like, you want her to be more herself, you want her to express herself?	- mother obeys father - this passivity alienates co-researcher	- dissatisfaction with image as given
37	Co - Yes, and I want . . . what I'm going to say now is associated with just recent feelings - in that . . . oh, I forget.	- co-researcher wants something - associated with recent feelings - then "forgets" - co-researcher <u>forgets</u> his wish	- forgotten desires, feelings are contained in response to the image - vagueness (semantic, visual) is a way of forgetting
	R - You were talking about how she always does what your dad says.		
38	Co - Yes. Oh, now I remember. It's that I want her to be more than a mother to me.	- co-researcher wants mother to be more than a mother	- physical stance is meaningful on many levels - reveals

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
(38)	She's always been almost like a perfect little mother. I want her to dance. R - What part of the image is most closely the perfect mother - what is most closely associated with that? Any part - an impression, feeling, an actual part of the image? 39 Co - Could you say that again? R - What part of the image is most closely associated with her being the perfect little mother? 40 Co - Short. (Short? I don't understand - the fact that she's short?) Yes. Well, everything . . . there's nothing especially of my image of her that really stands out as being more mother. The dress she's	- wants her to move (dance) out of her position - shortness emphasizes obedient mother/wife role.	person and nature of his/her relationship to spouse, to world

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
(40)	wearing, the way she has her hair, the glasses that she wears, the slippers that are old, the fact that she's a little overweight, and short, too. R - When I first asked you to see your parents standing in front of you, you said that you felt intimidated. Do you still have that feeling when you look at that image? (That feeling mostly disappeared.) Can you remember what that was, initially?		
41	Co - They were a lot taller than me. R - Really? Have they changed in appearance?		- image transforms as co-researcher attends to it.
42	Co - They've become shorter (laughter). My mom's become a bit shorter.	- mid-interview, parents are shorter, less intimidating	- image transforms as co-researcher attends to it. (table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
	R - Do you feel that those images are somewhat independent of your control?		
43	Co - No, not at all.	- image is in co-researcher's control	- image can ultimately be influenced, although sometimes it resists influence
	R - How do you come to that?		
44	Co - I can feel myself trying to put my father's face together. Even though I can't put it together, it feels like I can. It's frustrating that I can't right now. I don't know, it seems like even as I've been speaking, the images have changed.	- feeling that co-researcher ultimately determines what appears in the image - sense that the vague face can be "put together"	- image can ultimately be influenced, although sometimes it resists influence - sense that co-researcher can ultimately "remember"? perceive parents clearly?
	R - How have they changed?		
45	Co - The taller part. (Yes.) And . . . mostly just the taller part.		

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
	R - O.K., as you see them standing in front of you, switch them again. See if you can switch them.		
46	Co - I've just switched them. Everything's exactly the same, though. They've just been switched. The light's on the other side. And the darkness is on the other side. It's not darkness, it's - O.K., this is what it looks like. It's darkest around the outside and gets lighter as it gets toward the image. It's a little bit fuzzy, too, now.	- can switch parental image	- image can be manipulated
	R - Is it staying there? Or does it switch back and forth a bit?		
47	Co - It changes a lot.		
	R - When you switch them, is there any feeling of difficulty or discomfort in doing that?		- image "labile"

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
48	Co - Not this time. For some reason, though, I feel closer to my father when he's on the left. The picture's still the same. The picture doesn't feel menacing on the left. It's still the dark, but it doesn't feel menacing.	- greater ease in switching, as practice - left position is menacing at first, when father was there - now, it is not	- right-left position alone has meaning, significance
49	R - So the feelings for that part change when he's over on the left side? Co - Yes. R - O.K., that's all I'm going to ask you for now. Before we stop, I would like you to choose the most positive aspect of that image that you can see or feel.		
50	Co - The most positive thing about the image would be them standing inside the house most of the time. The most positive thing is	- positive - inside house sunlight window	

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
(50)	that there's sunlight in the window. The sunlight's always been in that image with my parents. That - for some reason, the window is positive.		
	R - O.K., I'd just like you to concentrate on that for a few minutes or for however long you like, and then when you feel you've finished doing that, just open your eyes.		
51	Co - I just want to say one thing. (Go ahead.) It's that when my father got changed to my left hand side, I started getting a little bit ... feelings in my left shoulder and my left arm. (Really? What kind of feelings?) A little bit sort of empty feelings. Sort of like the feelings you get in your arms when you want to hug somebody, I guess.	- when father on left, feelings in left shoulder and left arm - emptiness and longing (to hug)	- feelings embodied - left equals longing (originally, mother equals longing)

(table continues)

Example of Thematic Analysis - William's Protocol

Response Number	Protocol Text	Narrative Elements	First Order Themes
	R - Is there a longing? (Yes.) Have you ever had problems with that shoulder or that arm?		
52	Co - No. Just in that finger.		
	R - What kind of problems?		
53	Co - I had it broken playing football. Then I had it cut open when I was helping some plumbers. So that finger's gotten extra damage.	- damage to left finger	- image inhabits body? - body holds memory of experience?

(Co-researcher went on to recount incident in boyhood when, during a scuffle with his father, co-researcher bit finger on father's left hand. Mother had not intervened during fight, but rather she stood by.)

APPENDIX B

Second Order Themes - William (Dynamic Protocol)

1. The image reveals the co-researcher's response to fundamental elements of experience (e.g., vagueness, "leftness"). It reveals the meaning of these experiences to the co-researcher (e.g., vagueness implies aggressiveness) (6) (20) (25) (26) (49) (52).*
2. The physical attributes of home are not just sensory details--they hold events, experiences. These attributes tell an entire story (1) (2).
3. The location and activity of the parental image reveals the nature of the person (3) (4) (5). Parents belong in a characteristic stance or position (9) (10), and some (parents, positions) are more flexible than others (11).
4. The image is multi-faceted; one thing and another and another (e.g., a person has many faces in the image) (4) (5) (14) (28).
5. The image transforms in a variety of ways: a) over time, as the co-researcher attends to it (43) (49); b) attention to the image changes the viewing perspective (12); c) the image can transform at the suggestion of the co-researcher (44) (47); d) and also the researcher can influence it (17); e) the image seems to have a bi-polar nature (good turns to not-so-good which turns to good again) (4) (5) (14).
6. The image has a commanding presence (8) and activity of its own (11) (26) (27). This "integrity" of the image is revealed in the co-researcher's dissatisfaction with the image as it is given (27) (29) (31) (34) (37) (38).
7. There is participation in the image through a) an emotional response to it (34) (36), and b) a bodily response to it (16) (18). It is as if the co-researcher's feelings are embodied in the image, and the image is "embodied" in the co-researcher (e.g., the stomach jumps as the co-researcher sees the father image).
8. The meaning of the image is greater than its visual aspect--knowledge about the image is not entirely contained in appearance, but can come from other sources (e.g., visceral response) (15) (22). The image contains knowledge and perceptions not previously recognized.

* Note: The numbers in brackets refer to the number of the response line which contributed to the theme. See transcript of interview in Appendix A.

9. There is a reluctance to fully see and understand the image (4) (5). Forgotten desires are contained in the response to the image (37). Vagueness, both semantic and visual, is a way of forgetting (37) (45) and is associated with negative aspects of the image.
10. The time of the image is uncertain, ambiguous (3) (2) and is actually "no time," as the co-researcher suggests. There are different levels, moments of time contained in the image simultaneously (1) (2) and also successively (3) (4) (5) (14).

APPENDIX C

Second Order Themes - Hilary (Dynamic Protocol)

1. In the image of home dwells the memories and perceptions of childhood. To image is to re-visit that place, that time. The image of parents and family has good feelings and triggers a rush of experiences and memories.
2. The image has its own time which does not necessarily correspond to things as they are in "actual" or "present" time. The image inhabits an emotional time.
3. (Somatic response) The co-researcher bodily participates in the image. There is a synesthesia (seeing equals feeling) and a visceral response to the image. The visceral response betrays an energy of the image which is not obvious in visual appearance.
4. The parents are "polarized" and have complementary characteristics (e.g., energy vs. calm). The positions of the parents are flexible and there is not much discomfort when reversing the right-left positions.
5. Spontaneity of the image. The researcher's words summon unexpected images. The image responds to suggestion. The co-researcher experiences other spontaneous images in her daily life.
6. The image mirrors actual characteristics of the parents (e.g., father behaves with propriety, mother is energetic). However, it also expresses qualities of parents not previously recognized.
7. There is a certain integrity of the image--it does not always respond to suggestion (e.g., difference in temperature) and certain positions of the parents seem more natural than others.
8. The image is the emotional perception of parents--"the image holds so much of a feeling to it." The co-researcher "cannot separate seeing from feeling." The co-researcher is aware of a cognitive process of perception which is different from the emotional perception revealed in the image.
9. The meaning of the image is immediate. It expresses who the parents are by virtue of their appearance and the co-researcher's response to them. The image "looks" the way the co-researcher "feels" about the parent.

APPENDIX D

Second Order Themes - Miriam (Dynamic Protocol)

1. There is a polarity between parental images and also within an individual image (e.g., father is extremely stagnant, father is lively).
2. Time. The image is not confined to "real time." It reflects past and present, it collapses time. It summons the past and has a history to it.
3. The image has an inherent meaning, but this meaning can be inarticulate, ambiguous and unclear. The formal properties of the image (such as location, clarity, activity) are meaningful. Meaning can be drawn from abstract images. The different levels of meaning in the image illuminate each other.
4. The image reveals perceptions not previously recognized. The eidetic parent contradicts intellectual assumptions the co-researcher has about the parent and reveals the emotional impact of experiences. As Miriam describes, it "taps the recesses of the mind." The image causes the person to evaluate and reflect on the relationship to the parent.
5. There is discrimination between different kinds of imagery experiences. The Eidetic Parents Test is both similar to and different from other imagery. It is related to dream images, hypnogogic images and memories. However, a picture image is not the same as the eidetic parent image, and visualizing is not the same as seeing a spontaneous image.
6. Words. Different images are elicited by different words (e.g., image of home is different from image of house).
7. The image can be altered by the researcher's suggestion. However, the co-researcher can discriminate between what is given in the image and what is suggested. Suggestion directs attention to specific aspects of the image.
8. The image transforms as the co-researcher reflects upon it. It can assume an abstract, "unreal" form. The visual image responds to a shift in emotion. There is a healing effect of the image when it transforms in response to a realization. There can be a sense of relaxation, release. In summary, the image responds to, a) specific words, suggestions; b) shifts in emotion; c) shifts in attention; and d) ongoing, current experiences, interactions.
9. The image reflects the emotional relationship to the parent. It also elicits an emotional response which is consistent with the co-

researcher's current feelings in general and feelings about parents in particular.

10. The image is "somatized," and this is demonstrated clearly as the co-researcher attempts to switch right-left position of parents.
11. The image has an elusive quality and is at times paradoxical (e.g., as the co-researcher attends to the image, it disappears).
12. The image has a real presence and energy.
13. There is a sense of struggle with the image because it has a certain autonomy and resists some attempts of the co-researcher to influence it. It is as if there is a multiplicity of wills within the co-researcher. There is also struggle because the image reflects perceptions about the parents that the co-researcher does not want to recognize.

APPENDIX E

Second Order Themes - Mark (Dynamic Protocol)

1. The language of the image is poetic, inarticulate. It can elude description, defy words. Metaphor is needed to approximate description of the image.
2. The image transforms as the co-researcher attends to the most negative aspect--it shifts to a content and "process" which is more positive, although the exact meaning of the new image is inarticulate.
3. Words are important in eliciting images. For example, "home" conjures specific emotional associations, such as comfort, warmth, mother. A home does not equal a house. Also, the image reveals the meaning of the word (e.g., home) to the co-researcher. Words elicit memories and other images. The image of home contains the whole childhood.
4. The parental image is polarized. The two parents represent opposites. For example, emotional connection vs. no connection, good vs. bad, light vs. dark, pure vs. impure.
5. Some qualities of the parents are inherent in their right-left positions (e.g., right means white) and therefore to switch or reverse parental positions results in confusion and vagueness. The sense of parental identity is lost.
6. Negative aspects of the image are characterized by vagueness, ambiguity and uncertainty.
7. The image is in some respects autonomous (e.g., the co-researcher can't "float" the parents where he wants to) and does not respond to suggestion. In other respects, the image can change in response to suggestion.
8. The image expresses an emotional perception of parents. As the co-researcher attends to and articulates the image, impressions and judgments of the parents are re-evaluated and become more flexible. The visual aspect of the image completes a knowledge of the parents that was not previously recognized.
9. The meaning of the image is consistent at many levels, and the different levels of meaning illuminate each other (e.g., father is stiff, brown, deceased, as if in a cocoon; later - wrapped in a silky casing, as if in a stage where he's freer but still trapped).

APPENDIX F

Second Order Themes - Jill (Dynamic Protocol)

1. The image has levels of meaning, ranging from literal to more deeply significant. Example: "... initially it started off with specific clothing (colors). But it seemed to go beyond that. It seemed sort of an energy field that was depicted by this color that I saw on each of them." The levels of meaning revealed through color in this protocol include: clothing items, important qualities of parents (health), and energy fields.
2. The significance of the image is revealed as the co-researcher attends to it over time.
3. The energy of the image flows through the body.
4. Color is an important aspect of the image, one which makes a big impact. For this co-researcher, the colors reverse when parents exchange right-left positions. Colors have an identifiable meaning and the colors of the parents express distinctive qualities about them.
5. The activities of the parents in the image portray their relationship towards each other, relationship with the imager, and individual characteristics of the parents.
6. The instructions of the Eidetic Parents Test may not fit the imager's experience. For example, the request to see parents standing together leads to hesitation when the co-researcher's "natural" image of parents is to see them in a separated state.
7. Certain qualities of the image are inherent and cannot be changed. Example: the image exudes an "energy" which cannot be altered by the co-researcher. The co-researcher can change superficial things, such as articles of clothing.
8. The co-researcher has a rich imagery life which she uses to escape and to revitalize herself. Imagining certain images is energizing for her.

APPENDIX G

Second Order Themes - Rachel (Dynamic Protocol)

1. The parental image articulates the individual characteristics of each parent. The characteristics tend to be bi-polar, that is, to express opposite qualities. The parents are differentiated from each other with respect to, a) quality of space, b) energy level, c) power to evoke imaginative activity, d) relatedness to others, e) ability to communicate, f) emotions felt by co-researcher, and f) nature of relationship to co-researcher.
2. The image is experienced as having an identity and presence of its own, a certain integrity and autonomy. The image appears to have an inherent structure or configuration and the original arrangement of parents' right-left position is more congruent with this. The inherent structure is revealed during attempts to change or distort the image, and incongruence is felt by the co-researcher when this structure is violated. There is some evidence that the structure of the parental image precedes the Eidetic Parents Test because the co-researcher's "natural" image of her parents shows them in a separated state.
3. Kinesthetic involvement. The image is embodied in the co-researcher, who feels physically affected by parts of the image. The co-researcher is also embodied in the image, as revealed when the wishes and desires of the co-researcher are manifest in the structure of the image.
4. The images have many levels of meaning. The image of home seems to illustrate parental qualities. The physical stance of the parents expresses their attitudes, emotions, and the nature of their relationship to each other and the world. The meaning of the image emerges from reflection upon its relationship to real-life experiences. The structure of the image is different from the structure of "real-life" experience. The image can be interpreted and also rationalized. Overall, it appears that image and reality are separate but related domains which reflect each other.
5. Color is an important attribute of the image. The color boundaries are fluid and become entangled when the image is manipulated. Colors reveal attitudes and emotions of the parents and co-researcher, as well as the nature of relationships, and of general emotional atmosphere.
6. Dimensions of time. The eidetic parents image inhabits an "unreal," ambiguous time.

APPENDIX H

Second Order Themes - Gary (Static Protocol)

1. There is no deep emotional involvement in the image. There is an objective quality when the co-researcher evaluates the image.
2. The image is perceived as situation specific and therefore having only superficial significance (not profound, not meaningful). There is a rational explanation for the image.
3. There is doubt and uncertainty expressed about the value of the Eidetic Parents Test exercise.
4. The co-researcher actively constructs the image and experiences much control over it. He feels that the image can be easily changed and manipulated.
5. The parents are isolated in space, time and activity in the parental home but they do not express clear bi-polar qualities. Rather, they both have somewhat negative qualities, with the father being more negative, and the co-researcher's feelings towards him more ambivalent.
6. Aspects of the image do not fit "reality" but show peculiarities of time and of space which are surprising to the co-researcher (in image of parental home). They are not, however, considered to be significant.
7. The image cannot be clearly discriminated from memory.
8. There is little kinesthetic involvement in the image.

APPENDIX I

Second Order Themes - Candice (Static Protocol)

1. There is a sense of difficulty, uncertainty and cautiousness surrounding the whole exercise.
2. The images are vague and unclear (both of home and of parents). There is an absence of sensory detail - no specific colors stand out, there is no sense of temperature. There is some uncertainty about whether the image is a memory or not.
3. Parents are seen as a unified couple and their individual differences are poorly discriminated. The unity of the couple is demonstrated by their activity, stance and in the feelings of security the co-researcher has when she sees them together. After much pushing by the researcher, the co-researcher can make some discrimination of individual parental characteristics.
4. The image reveals superficial differences of the parents (e.g., height, color of hair) - which are not of general significance.
5. The integrity of the image is felt when co-researcher experiences discomfort while reversing the parental position. There is some awareness that the co-researcher does not have complete control over the images, although the images can sometimes be changed at will.
6. The image is static rather than dynamic. There is some slight change of the image over time: the faces of parents become clearer as the co-researcher attends to the image.
7. The co-researcher takes an objective, distant view of parental images and there is little kinesthetic or emotional involvement. When the researcher prods, the co-researcher does begin to contemplate her response to the parents.